Guidance Note on Fragility Assessments

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GUIDANCE NOTE ON FRAGILITY ASSESSMENTS

For additional resources and support, you may contact the g7+ focal point within your national government or the New Deal Helpdesk by writing to NewDeal.helpdesk@pbsbdialogue.org. Further information is also available on the New Deal website: http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/.

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FRAGILITY ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE NOTE

This guidance note seeks to support the implementation of New Deal fragility assessments in fragile and conflict-affected states. It should not be seen as a strict step-by-step guide. Rather, it provides guidance to support context-specific processes; elements described herein should always be tailored to local needs and priorities. This guidance is based on the experience, lessons and insight generated by g7+ countries that piloted implementation of the fragility assessment between 2012 and 2013.

1. WHAT IS A FRAGILITY ASSESSMENT?

A fragility assessment is an inclusive and participatory exercise carried out by national stakeholders to assess a country’s causes, features and drivers of fragility as well as the sources of resilience within a country. In doing so, it takes a look not only at historical legacies but also at more recent and current drivers of fragility. Its objectives are to:

- Develop a shared understanding among how national stakeholders of the drivers and features of fragility and sources of resilience in their country;
- Promote inclusive multi-stakeholder dialogue about the challenges to peacebuilding and statebuilding;
- Identify possible areas of incremental progress towards resilience, including targets in line with the New Deal’s Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs);
- Help fragile and conflict-affected states and development partners to assess and manage risks jointly.

It is important to ensure a full discussion among stakeholders on the drivers of conflict and fragility and come to a minimum level of consensus. This should not be mixed up or confused with discussions on the PSGs. While they may be complementary, they are not the same.

While a fragility assessment may draw from many existing studies, its particular “added value” is bringing out and reflecting the views of national stakeholders, many of which may not be engaged in regular dialogue with national authorities or policy circles in the capital. Therefore, the value of its findings is not only in presenting a clear picture of the country’s sources of fragility and resilience, but also in reflecting the views of those either affected by the current fragility or have a role in building peace and resilience.

2. WHY DO A FRAGILITY ASSESSMENT?

The whole idea of a fragility assessment is to generate a better understanding of the sources and drivers of fragility from the perspectives of the country’s citizens themselves. It is a first step to develop country-owned solutions to the challenges facing the country.
It also acknowledges that progress towards greater stability and resilience can be achieved in an incremental fashion, using a step-by-step approach for resetting state-society relations and building confidence in the population.

A fragility assessment should identify critical fault lines that need to be considered by policy makers and planners when setting priorities and designing interventions. It should provide an opportunity for a range of national stakeholders to express their views of the past, present and future of the country. These views can provide a good basis for forging “one vision, one plan” for achieving country-specific PSGs, along with the related planning and financing instruments for implementing it. It should help these policy makers and planners to work on the PSGs in a more integrated fashion and “avoid silos”.

So, linking the findings of the fragility assessment to the design of new policies, plans and programmes (or the adaptation of existing ones) is absolutely critical to ensuring that they either address the sources and drivers of fragility or are sensitive to them.

### THREE CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS

<table>
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<th>I. Flexibility and context-specificity</th>
<th>II. Awareness raising and buy-in</th>
<th>III. Strategic timing</th>
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<td>Guidance, tools and templates should be used only so far as they are helpful. The assessment should be adapted to local circumstances and focus on the most relevant country-specific issues.</td>
<td>This is necessary across government and across society. The whole process should be led by local people and conducted in local languages as appropriate.</td>
<td>Fragility assessments should be conducted when there is some window of opportunity to contribute to a truly meaningful process and product that will actively be used.</td>
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### 3. WHAT SHOULD IT ACHIEVE?

The fragility assessment should produce three **key outputs**:

- A **synthesis report** providing an analysis of the root causes of fragility, the drivers of conflict, and the sources of resilience -- as understood by the country’s citizens. This report should also indicate potential areas of engagement in support of the PSGs.

- A **more detailed report** that captures the full findings of the assessment, an analysis of conflict, fragility and resilience, on the one hand, and how they relate to each PSG, on the other. The latter should ideally include a completed “fragility spectrum” describing

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1 Such instruments may include a compact or mutual accountability framework, a medium-term expenditure framework, national / sector budget, sector plans, public investment programmes, donor-supported projects, etc.
the crisis, current stage, incremental next stage and resilience stages for each dimension. This longer report should also capture any general lessons about the fragility assessment process that the country wishes to pass on to other G7+ countries.

- **A list of country indicators** (or targets) that the country would like to use to assess progress in relation to key dimensions of the fragility spectrum. This list should also indicate the availability of the data at the local level and any requirements for data collection to ensure that the indicators can be successfully monitored at the country level.\(^2\)

As a **desired outcome**, a fragility assessment should, at minimum, contribute to one key outcome: the forging of policy and programmes responses (and/or the adaptation of existing ones) to address the drivers of conflict and fragility. “One vision, one plan” followed by a compact would be the ideal outcome. These instruments can set priorities, targets, and indicators for making and monitoring progress towards addressing the drivers of conflict and fragility. However, in reality, country transitions are not always as sequential.

Nevertheless, the government needs to use the findings of a fragility assessment as an input towards forging appropriate policy outcomes. To do so, the findings should also feed into the government’s dialogue with civil society and the international community (both security, diplomatic and development). This dialogue – informed by the fragility assessment – can help in setting priorities and sequencing responses. Thinking on how to link findings to existing policy and planning processes should be done at the outset of the fragility assessment process.

The assessment findings should also be used to ‘stress-test’ government and donor plans to ensure no activity will serve to undermine emerging resilience, or exacerbate points of fragility.

**4. WHEN SHOULD IT BE DONE?**

The following questions can help identify the most appropriate and strategic timing for conducting a fragility assessment:

- **What can a fragility assessment help to achieve within this context?** Could the four objectives feasibly and realistically be met?
- **How would a fragility assessment feed into other initiatives?** Is a national development planning process soon to commence? Are there plans to develop a compact?
- **When are circumstances most likely to enable a genuinely inclusive whole-of-society process?**
- **Does the government have the capacity to implement a fragility assessment?** What additional support might be required (for instance, from the G7+ or International Dialogue Secretariats)?

\(^2\) Such indicators may be reflected in national policies and plans, and thus embedded in existing processes for monitoring, where possible, in order to track progress. In particular, compacts may serve as a useful instrument for not only tracking progress, but also shaping political dialogue and ensuring the mutual accountability of both government and donors.
• Is there genuine highest-level political will and commitment to own the fragility assessment process and use its findings?

The fragility assessment is not envisaged as a one-off exercise. It should be revisited and revised as the context changes or simply updated every two or three years. This reflects a commitment to ensuring that national self-assessment drives ongoing policy planning and implementation. This requires a clear plan on how the fragility assessment itself will be kept current and ‘alive’.

Periodic fragility assessments should follow a similar methodology to the initial assessment, in order to ensure that issues are considered from a ‘blank slate’ perspective, rather than being led by previous findings. It will be important, however, for repeat assessments to include an additional step in which their findings are compared with previous findings and any changes identified and understood.

What is a fragility spectrum?

A fragility spectrum is a tool developed by the g7+ to allow fragile and conflict-affected states to analyse and assess the nature of their own fragility. They can situate themselves according to a number of stages of fragility relating to each of the five PSGs. It is a qualitative diagnostic tool that draws on local knowledge to facilitate the self-assessment process, to help countries understand their current position in the transition process and to adjust planning to the needs of that specific stage. It aims to identify directions and track incremental progress. The most recent version of the Guidance Note on Fragility Spectrums can be found at:

http://static.squarespace.com/static/5212dafbe4b0348b94222a511/t/538e3f65e4b01a8314ebe5/1401831269040/g7%20English%20FS%20Note%20Design.pdf

5. WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE?

Wide and inclusive participation is essential for legitimacy, credibility, and to give the process the best chance of producing meaningful and influential outcomes: the single most important factor determining the success of a fragility assessment is therefore the ability to engage the right people in meaningful dialogue.

Participants should include both those people who are significant in moving the country towards resilience and those who represent a stumbling block on this path. It is important that reasonable gender, region and ethnicity balance among identity groups is evident across participants. Consequently, it may be important to hold sub-regional workshops as well as workshops in the capital in order to enable this.

It will also be important to decide early on what role development partners should have in the assessment process; to clearly define the scope, level and timing of their involvement. As it is critical that the fragility assessment remains a country-owned and country-led process, there are strong arguments for limiting the engagement of development partners in the workshop stage of the process in order to ensure that national voices dominate. If this approach is followed, it will be important to actively engage development partners...
particularly in Steps 2, 6 and 7 (sensitisation, validation and communication). The task force may also wish to hold briefing sessions specifically with development partners to ensure their engagement outside of the actual dialogue and assessment stage.

Some lessons learnt

- Pilot fragility assessments reported some difficulty in ensuring the attendance of the right mix and number of people at workshops. Civil society, the private sector and representatives from the regions proved particularly hard to engage, and it also proved difficult to ensure sufficiently senior levels of representation from government ministries and agencies.

- Experience has shown that enabling meaningful participation can require more than creating the space and inviting representatives. The task force should consider strategies for overcoming these challenges, such as issuing invitations from high-profile officials sufficiently early in the planning process, following-up invitations with reminder calls, using any established networks to encourage attendance, providing support for example to civil society to help them organise and articulate their views, and holding pre-consultation events with particular groups of stakeholders or additional workshops at sub-national / regional levels.
6. **HOW CAN A FRAGILITY ASSESSMENT BE DONE?**

The process by which a fragility assessment is conducted is just as important as the findings it generates. While each country context is different, the approach to conducting a fragility assessment in each one will have some key steps in common. So far, seven key steps are outlined below that can be adapted all country contexts.

The process by which the fragility assessment is done is just as important as the accuracy of the findings. This is not solely a research exercise, but also one to start a conversation among stakeholders – particularly between the government and marginalised communities – where none may have previously existed. Therefore, “subjective” views are as important as “objective” facts.

**Step 1: Establish task force**

The task force has the collective responsibility for delivering the fragility assessment. It is typically led from the highest levels of government and supported by the g7+ focal point. It consists of about half a dozen members that should include ideally a nominated lead for each PSG – typically senior officials from the relevant government ministries, the national statistics office plus one civil society focal point. It may be helpful to nominate one overall focal point with responsibility for coordinating the whole fragility assessment process.

**Agree the objectives, method and approach for conducting the fragility assessment:** That’s the first thing the task force has to do. This includes deciding on the necessary preparatory steps, the best way of engaging highest level decision-makers, and how the process will inform national priority setting and planning processes. This can be done through an initial meeting of task force members.

**Identify resources for delivery of the assessment:** That’s the next step. Development partners may support the process through the provision of technical assistance to the task force.

**Step 2: Sensitise stakeholders**

**Stakeholder mapping:** The task force should identify key stakeholders involved in issues relating to conflict and fragility, on the one hand, and peacebuilding and statebuilding, on the other. This means that there may be two categories of stakeholders to take into account. First, there are those who can provide views on the deep-rooted sources of conflict and drivers of fragility as well as sources of resilience. Second, there are those whose cooperation or involvement will be needed to moving the country towards the PSGs. Depending on the context, they may not always be the same group of stakeholders.

**Stakeholder briefings:** The task force should brief stakeholders on the New Deal and the fragility assessment. The objective here is to begin to build real ownership of the process. This should be achieved through whatever approach is most appropriate in the local context.
(possibly conducting three separate briefings for state institutions, civil society and development partners or holding one collective launch event for all stakeholders).

**One-to-one meetings:** These briefings should be followed up with one-to-one meetings with key individuals to ensure their understanding, buy-in and ownership; this will be particularly important to generate political support and high-level buy-in from senior officials, representatives and partners.

The task force should pay particular attention to the ability of civil society to engage meaningfully in the fragility assessment, placing emphasis on supporting their ability to organise members and engage actively.

### Step 3: Conduct background research

The task force should gather relevant background information through identifying existing material relating to the assessment and/or conducting interviews with key informants.

**Document review:** Conduct a document review of all relevant reports and analysis conducted within the last two-three years by the government, civil society, researchers and academics and development partners (e.g. Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA), Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), national visioning exercises, Truth and Reconciliation reports, sector plans).

Information gathered through this process should then be used to:

- **Capture the key drivers and dynamics of conflict** in the country, historically and in the present day;
- **Identify key areas of focus** for the fragility assessment; and
- **Extract information and provisionally populate the ‘crisis’ and ‘resilience’ stages** of the fragility spectrum (these draft definition descriptions will be validated in the next phase of the assessment).

An analysis of the drivers of conflict and fragility, alongside resilience should also be used a tool to stimulate thinking within and across PSG areas. There may be multiple existing analyses that can be synthesized and/or a fresh process-based analysis can be undertaken – e.g. as was done in DRC by civil society – that informed the undertaking of the Fragility Spectrum analysis and indicator development.

The process of research and information gathering should be guided by the fragility spectrum. Additional dimensions can be added depending on relevance to the context.

Background research should be presented in brief summary form as background reading to workshop participants prior to the workshop(s), and should be distributed sufficiently in advance.

### Step 4: Hold consultative workshops

The focus of this step of the process is on bringing together an inclusive group of stakeholders to engage in open dialogue, discuss and assess key questions.
Six key questions to discuss:

1. What are the root causes of conflict, immediate drivers of conflict, and existing sources of resilience in our country?
2. What were things like during the crisis stage in our country?
3. What do we think things will be like when we reach the resilience stage?
4. What are things like now? E.g. Where would you position the country on a scale of 1 (most fragile) to 5 (least fragile)?
5. Where do we want to go? What steps are needed to get there?
6. What priority issues (‘indicator areas’) are most important for monitoring progress?

These questions can be used as the basis for workshop agendas (see suggested templates in annex). They should be considered in relation to each of the PSGs and across their various dimensions. Outcomes of the discussions relating to each question should then be used to develop, refine and validate the draft outline fragility spectrum. It is important, however, that the workshop does not become too focused on the process of completing the fragility spectrum. Open dialogue and debate must take precedence.

Design of the workshop: A number of key decisions will need to be made relating to:

- **Length of the workshops.** This will depend on the number of issues to be address and the number of stakeholders involved. Two types of discussions will need to happen. First, one on the sources and drivers of fragility and conflict. Second, one on how the country can move towards resilience and peace, with a particular focus on the PSGs. The number and length of the workshops will depend on the local context and the resources made available.

- **When to introduce the fragility spectrum.** Possible options to consider include: presenting the draft outline of the fragility spectrum at the beginning of the workshop in order to structure the event and focus discussions on identified priority issues (though this creates risk of expert bias or constrained discussion), or introducing the spectrum only after substantive discussion (though this creates risk of unfocused or repetitive discussion).

- **How to fill in the spectrum.** The fragility spectrum can be populated in its entirety (defining what each stage would look like in the specific country context) or it can be partially completed. The most important stages to define in the workshop, however, are the current position the stage to get to next (i.e. what incremental progress would look like). The ‘crisis’ and ‘resilience’ stages should have been pre-populated during the background research stage.3

- **Facilitation of workshops.** The workshops themselves should preferably be co-chaired by a senior government official and a representative of civil society. Members of the task force could act as facilitators. They should bear in mind the following:

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3 Note that generic descriptions of each stage of fragility and a consolidated fragility spectrum have been developed by the g7+ (see the g7+ ‘Note on the g7+ Fragility Spectrum’ launched in Kinshasa, 27 November 2013). These may provide a useful inspiration at this stage in the process.
a) The focus of the assessment is on fragility and resilience: discussions on all of the PSGs should be framed in this light (i.e. ‘what are the implications of this on fragility/resilience’).

b) A transition from fragility to resilience is not always linear, and relapses may occur. It should not be assumed that transitions are naturally progressive, and that one stage on the fragility spectrum will naturally or automatically lead to the next.

c) It is important to consider cross-cutting issues and connections between the PSGs rather than only discussing each PSG in isolation.

It will also be important to have sufficient note-takers to capture the full discussions.

**Step 5: Develop indicators**

National stakeholders may seek to agree a small number of indicators (1-5 per PSG) that will be tracked in-country in order to both monitor incremental progress towards resilience and to serve as early warning flags to highlight when a relapse may occur and quick preventive action may need to be taken.

**Country specific indicators:** Each country will develop its own country-specific set of indicators. These are intended to specifically focus on the transition from the current to the next stage of fragility as well as to allow for measuring progress across the stages. Countries in earlier stages of fragility may wish to emphasise more input-type indicators (measuring level of effort invested), while countries at intermediate stages may choose to focus more on capacity indicators (measuring institutional performance) and countries at later stages may focus on outcome indicators. The task force should decide how they wish to identify and agree these indicators, as it is critical that the indicators chosen are relevant to the country context and its specific features of fragility and resilience.

**General ‘indicator areas’:** In addition, it is recommended that general ‘indicator areas’ are identified at the workshops. This is a critical step in the identification of priority issues, and broad involvement is therefore imperative.

**Develop actual indicators:** They should be based on the priority ‘indicator areas’ (at least one per ‘indicator area’). Parameters for the development of indicators are available to assist (see annex), as is a list of common and consolidated indicators that may be used as a source of inspiration in this step of the process.

**Establish the extent of data availability** for the proposed indicators: This includes sources, age of the data, frequency and consistency of collection. Data sources will include government departments and statistical offices, chambers of commerce, multilateral and bilateral databases and civil society monitoring systems. It is important to note that these indicators should not be constrained by existing datasets; this should also be seen as an opportunity for innovation.

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4 For example: the capacity of the military (under PSG 2) may impact on legitimate politics (PSG 1) – if these issues were discussed only in isolation such critical aspects could be overlooked.

5 The selection of indicators should be stage-specific in order to avoid a country to being ‘set up to fail’.

6 See the g7+ ‘Note on the g7+ Fragility Spectrum’ launched in Kinshasa, 27 November 2013 and ‘Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Indicators – Progress, Interim List and next steps’, Third International Dialogue Global Meeting, Washington, D.C., 19 April 2013.
opportunity to identify meaningful indicators for which data is not yet collected, but which can and should be collected.

The development of indicators is a both a political and technical task. Initially, it should be undertaken in close partnership with the national statistical body, relevant line ministry technical officers, statistical officers, monitoring and evaluation officers, and civil society. Thereafter, it will be important for the task force to ensure the necessary political buy-in within government and/or the legislature, since indicators suggest accountability for making progress against them. That being said, it is still crucial to maintain the validity of each indicator and to clearly map them back to the original ‘indicator area’ identified by stakeholders.

**Step 6: Test and validate findings**

**Conduct a review**: Draft findings should reviewed by an independent group of experts and observers whose specific mandate is to challenge and critique the findings in order to ensure that they are as robust as possible. They should also ensure that nothing of significance has been overlooked. This independent group can be drawn from civil society and/or the development partner community.

**Validate the findings**: The draft outputs (in multiple local languages if applicable) should be shared with all stakeholders involved in the process so far in order to widely validate the findings. This can be done through a virtual consultation and/or a validation workshop. If appropriate and feasible, it may also be beneficial to involve Cabinet and/or Parliament in this process of validation.

It is important to note that validation should not be merely a ‘tick-box exercise’ – it should be expected that there should be pushback and disagreement on the findings presented. Dialogue and debate and any resultant amendment of the draft outputs will improve their credibility and validity.

**Step 7: Communicate and use findings**

**Share outputs as widely as possible**: Once the findings have been validated and finalised, the task force should share outputs with all stakeholders involved in the process. In addition, it should formulate a dissemination strategy, targeting partners and stakeholders who may not have been involved in the fragility assessment, but whose buy-in and cooperation may be needed for forging policies, plans and programmes for addressing its findings. This may include top-level government officials, political parties and movements, business leaders, the media, and civil society. Dissemination is very dependent on context. At minimum, findings need to be shared with the Secretariat of the International Dialogue and of the g7+. Events should also be organised to launch the fragility assessment report.

**Deliver briefings to key stakeholders**: The task force should therefore brief key stakeholders who will be expected to use the findings of the assessment (e.g. government planning authorities, development partners) to ensure that they fully understand the process, its outcomes and implications for them. It is important that this socialisation of the findings and their implications happens at the very highest levels.

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7 A red team is an independent group that is explicitly mandated to provide constructively critical challenge to a proposal or product in the final stage of its development.
7. WHAT RESOURCES ARE NEEDED?

The scope and depth of a fragility assessment will be in part determined by the resources allocated (both technical and financial). To determine such allocation, it would be important to reflect on the following questions:

- **How much time will the assessment take?**
  Although the process should be designed to fit each country’s specific requirements, it can be expected that a fragility assessment should take approximately two-three months to complete (based on the experience of g7+ countries). The more time that can be devoted to planning and preparation the more likely it is that a broad array of stakeholders can be mobilised, and the more time that can be given to workshops the more participants will be able to engage in meaningful in-depth dialogue.

  The scope of the assessment should, however, be commensurate with the amount of available time – which in turn will depend on resource availability and the timing of other processes into which a fragility assessment should feed (see section 2 regarding the ‘desired outcome’).

- **What resources will be required and what funding is available to cover these?**
  Likely costs include technical support (assessments conducted so far have mostly employed one or two consultants for a period between two and six weeks) and workshop expenses (catering, travel and per diems or reimbursement of costs for regional representatives). Regional-level consultations will be particularly expensive.

- **Who will support the process? Is technical assistance desirable and/or available?**
  The organisation and management of a “fragility assessment” is challenging in terms of logistics. Although the use of consultants can help relieve the burden of planning and implementation, their involvement could potentially have a negative impact on ownership. The task force should carefully consider both the pros and cons of technical assistance before making this decision.

- **What will the impact be on organizational capacity?**
  Participation in the assessment will take people away from their other responsibilities. In many contexts where the capacity of both state institutions and civil society is limited, the assessment will therefore represent a significant opportunity cost that must be considered.

It is important for the task force to develop a clear sense of the resources needed to undertake the fragility assessment at the outset. This way, it can engage the relevant parts of government, the local donor community, and if needed, the g7+ Secretariat. The latter can make those countries and organisations involved in the International Dialogue aware of the need for such resources with a view to mobilising them.

For technical support on the fragility assessment process itself, the task force can contact the New Deal Help Desk at the International Dialogue Secretariat by writing to NewDeal.helpdesk@pbsbdialogue.org.
**ANNEX A**

**Definition of key terms**

The g7+ define *fragility* as “as a period of time during nationhood when sustainable socio-economic development requires greater emphasis on complementary peacebuilding and statebuilding activities such as building inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of resources, and accountable and fair service delivery”.

*Resilience* refers to “the ability of social institutions to absorb and adapt to the internal and external shocks and setbacks they are likely to face. Fragility thus implies that the consolidation of nationhood, and the safety, security and wellbeing of the citizens are at risk of a relapse into crisis or violent conflict. This risk is gradually reduced as the institutions develop the necessary ability to cope with the type of threats they are exposed to.”

The g7+ has also developed generic descriptions of each stage of fragility according to the fragility spectrum. These descriptions are provided below.

It is worth noting that the g7+ prefers to define *PSG 1* as ‘Inclusive Politics’ rather than ‘Legitimate Politics’.

**Stage 1: Crisis.** A situation of crisis can refer to the period where there is acute instability in a country, with increased levels of violent conflict, the potential for a lapse into more generalised violent conflict, or where there has been a natural or manmade disaster. Frequently in this period, there are major political divisions and often conflict amongst communities, leading to widespread mistrust and fear. The security forces may be committing widespread human rights abuses and perpetrating endemic corruption, and consequently there is lack of public confidence in the security institutions. The security sector is typically fragmented and often in the process of being reformed. Rule of law is typically eroded and politicized and the economic sector is severely constrained. During this phase, justice institutions often only exist at a national level, and not at the local or regional level, and the country faces many human rights violations not addressed by the state. Due justice processes become less well followed and violence as a means to settle disputes is resorted to more frequently. Basic government services are likely to be weak or have ceased to exist, and the international humanitarian and aid community may have stepped in to provide emergency relief. International Institutions may also be providing security support in the form of police or peacekeeping missions. Government revenues are often low or non-existent, and countries often face illegal or informal exploitation of natural resources and weak enforcement of regulations of natural resources management.

**Stage 2: Rebuild & Reform.** During this phase, renewed efforts towards political dialogue to resolve political differences may be in evidence. However, there is often inequitable power sharing between groups. Some progress can be seen on disarmament processes, but security issues remain a challenge for the country’s stability, with high proliferation of small arms. Institutions are often weak and inadequate, and deliver services sporadically to the population. As compared to the crisis phase, the intensity of conflict and political disputes

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8 See the g7+ ‘Note on the g7+ Fragility Spectrum’ launched in Kinshasa, 27 November 2013
are more manageable and there are early efforts to establish stronger security institutions and recruitment of personnel. However, in this stage, security institutions performance is likely to remain weak. Justice institutions are starting to have a presence beyond national capitals but often are not effective and legislation is not effectively enforced. In relation to economic foundations, basic infrastructure and an enabling economic environment is beginning to be put in place but high unemployment rates are still to be found, particularly amongst the youth. During this phase, large potential sources of domestic revenue may have been identified (e.g. natural resources and/or customs), but these are poorly accounted for, benefiting only a small sector of the population. Whilst countries have started the process of reforming public financial management, budget execution problems remain, and accountability is weak.

Stage 3: Transition. This stage is often associated with the signature of agreements and an overall situation of stability. There is more space for formal dialogue between parties, which leads to the creation of institutions to support the dialogue process, including the existence of electoral institutions. Whilst there should be increased stability in the country, there is also the likely presence of corruption and challenges in working with strong opposition groups. There is often weak oversight capacity from the legislature. In comparison to the previous phases, there is an increase in the quality, oversight and advocacy from civil society and some initial degree of free media. There may be an increased control of security by the state, although this continues to be weakened by lack of resources and capacity. Often, there is also an increased confidence in security and justice institutions, with a commensurate reduction in the use of violence to resolve disputes. Efforts to decentralize justice systems can be found, including the presence of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. During this stage, there may be increased access to basic infrastructure, but mainly in urban areas. Whilst government is most commonly still the largest employer, there are signs of more jobs being created in the private sector and an increase in government revenue, particularly from natural resources (if they exist), tax collection and other sources of revenue. Stronger basic services are provided, with an enhanced but poorly implemented regulatory framework.

Stage 4: Transformation. In the transformation stage, a country may have increased resilience within society, and conflicts are more often resolved peacefully. There is often a hosting of credible, non-violent and democratic political processes. Civil society begins to play an active role in political and societal debates, and increasingly good governance principles are adhered to. However, in this period there may also be a lack of public understanding of good governance principles. During this phase, the security situation has typically remained stable and peaceful for a considerable amount of time, often for at least 5 years. More likely, one should encounter the presence of security personnel throughout the territory, but with limited numbers and capacity. Also, it is expected that there is increased public confidence in security institutions, and potential abuses are more frequently sanctioned. Economically, an enabling environment for business development may be found, with increased jobs opportunities, including in the private sector. Public institutions may be capable of better managing domestic revenues, through well-structure and coordinated tax and customs collection. Usually, there is an implementation of a decentralisation to expand access to basic services to the whole country.

Stage 5: Resilience. Resilience can be understood as the capacity of a society to deal with its challenges and to absorb shocks without relapsing into crisis. Every stage in the Fragility
Spectrum represents growing resilience, but at this stage the resilience of the society has been institutionalised in its social customs, cultural practices, social contract and formal state institutions to the degree that a relapse into crisis is so unlikely that the country in question can no longer meaningfully be considered to be a post-conflict country. The focus thus shifts away from socio-political consolidation to long-term social and economic development. During this period, political stability has been seen for a prolonged amount of time, often for more than 20 years, and the country should have created a strong culture of democracy and good governance. During this period, it is possible that the country has created a space for good understanding by the citizens of the political process. The government should be responsive in combating corruption, with transparent and inclusive processes. Fundamental rights are more likely to be upheld, and the roles of civil society should have been defined. Peace and security during this phase has prevailed for a long time. There should be sufficient security personnel throughout the country, and high level of confidence by the population. There is demonstrated political will to fight elite impunity, and widespread awareness of how the formal justice system operates. Good infrastructure connecting different parts of the country would be found, and private sector should now represent a large share of the labour market. Systems are likely to be in place for properly managing natural resources and government [probably generate enough revenue to provide essential services to its citizens. Public institutions function both at national and sub-national level, and the state increasingly becomes the main service provider for basic services.
ANNEX B

Some guidance on developing indicators

The selection of indicators should be guided by the following parameters:

1. Indicators should avoid duplicating Millennium Development Goals and other measures of more general development, focusing instead on indicators that reflect how sectorial efforts interact with drivers of conflict and fragility and contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding. Indicators should be measured at least annually when possible.

2. Indicators should be selected based on, or aim to be backed by, baseline data collection capabilities.

3. Indicators should reinforce statistical capacity in countries undertaking fragility assessments. National statistical offices should lead and coordinate the data collection process and should be the primary source of data, where possible. Indicators will be drawn from civil society, academic, private sector and UN/international agencies only when the national statistics offices cannot collect the data.

4. Indicator data collection methods and mechanisms should be reliable and transparent.

5. Indicators should be simple, relevant and practical. They should be easy to communicate and should measure real and broad progress in the PSG area, and in the everyday lives of people.

6. Indicators should be adaptable to norms and traditions of the country and able to be localized to the country context.

7. Indicators should be balanced to demonstrate changes in both government capacity and performance (e.g. a mix of input/output and outcome/impact indicators).

8. Indicators should be balanced to also capture population views of progress.

9. Indicators should be as much as possible disaggregated by gender, region and identity group.

10. Indicators should reflect short-term progress as well as longer-term institutional reform, consistent with the concept of the fragility spectrum.
ANNEX C

Tools and templates

**Suggested agenda for fragility assessment workshop (example: Day 1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:30</td>
<td>Arrival and registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>Welcome remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>Introduction to the <em>New Deal</em> – presentation[^9]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Explaining the Fragility Assessment – presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00</td>
<td>Plenary – presentation back from groups, discussion and validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>Introduction to PSG 1 and objectives for the afternoon[^12]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:15</td>
<td>What does ‘legitimate politics’ mean, and what is required for this?[^13]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>The fragility spectrum[^14] – presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:45</td>
<td>Validation: what were things like during the crisis stage in our country, and what do we think things will be like when we reach the resilience stage?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:15</td>
<td>Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30</td>
<td>What are things like now, what would progress look like, and what (‘indicator areas’ should be used to monitor progress[^15] – breakout groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30</td>
<td>Plenary – presentation back from groups, discussion and validation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:15</td>
<td>Questions and wrap up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Close</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^9]: This should ideally be delivered by the highest level ‘sponsors’ of the process.

[^10]: Use hand-outs (see page 15).

[^11]: Breakout groups should focus on each different dimension of the PSG; group composition should be as varied as possible across stakeholder groups.

[^12]: The agenda herein to be repeated on subsequent days for other PSGs. Meetings should be led by each PSG focal person.

[^13]: Present overview of general meaning in the New Deal context (using dimensions from the fragility spectrum) then open for discussion on what it means in the specific country context.

[^14]: The draft spectrum to be presented will include draft descriptions of the ‘crisis’ and ‘resilience’ stages based on background research.

[^15]: Use hand-outs (see page 16).
**Workshop break-out group instructions:** what drives conflict and fragility and what helps build resilience in our country?

*Answer each of the questions below. You have one hour to do this in your group. You should agree one person to chair your group and one person to be prepared to present your findings back to the whole group.*

*In answering these questions you should focus on your group’s specific dimensions according to the fragility spectrum.*

*The questions you need to answer in relation to your topic are:*

1. What are the root causes of conflict in our country? *Think about:*
   a) What has caused conflict to occur and to spread?
   b) What issues would need to be dealt with to stop conflict?

2. What are the immediate drivers of conflict in our country? *Think about:*
   a) What specific issues risk or sustain conflict now?
   b) What grievances in particular need to be addressed now?
   c) What would signal that things are really changing now?

3. What are the existing sources of resilience in our country? *Think about:*
   a) What is good about the way things work in this country?
   b) What sustained people during crisis?
   c) How could these things be strengthened further or be used more effectively in the reconstruction of the country?

**Workshop break-out group instructions:** what are things like now, what would progress look like, and what ‘indicator areas’ should be used to monitor progress

*Answer each of the questions below. You have one hour to do this in your group. You should agree one person to chair your group and one person to be prepared to present your findings back to the whole group.*

*In answering these questions you should focus on your group’s specific dimensions according to the fragility spectrum.*

*The questions you need to answer in relation to your topic are:*
1. What are things like in our country now? Think about:
   a) What has changed to make the country less fragile than it used to be?
   b) In what ways is the country still fragile?
   c) Could these factors still risk a return to conflict?
   d) How much motivation (societal demand and/or political will) is there to improve things?
   e) Is there any momentum? (either positive or negative trends)
   f) How much maintenance is needed? (is the current position self-sustaining, or does it need a lot just to stay where it is?)
   g) Where would you position the country on a scale of 1 (most fragile) to 5 (least fragile)?

2. If we can move further towards resilience, what will the immediate next stage look like?

3. What priority issues (‘indicator areas’) are most important to monitor progress?
ANNEX D

Suggested structure for Fragility Assessment Synthesis Report

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
[Include objectives and key findings – one page maximum]

2. CONTEXT
[Two pages maximum]
2.2 Country context
2.3 Methodology
2.4 Reflections on the process

3. KEY FINDINGS: FRAGILITY AND RESILIENCE
[5 pages maximum]
3.1 Understanding fragility in [country]
[Key causes and features of fragility; drivers of conflict, risk factors]
3.2 Understanding resilience in [country]
[Key causes and features of resilience, outline of ‘where we have come from’ – crisis stage]
3.3 [Country] today
[Baseline of current fragility according to the fragility spectrum, with description of current stage of fragility for each PSG. Outline of most significant strengths and challenges]
3.4 A strong and stable nation
[Outline of the ‘resilience’ stage and a ‘feel’ for the gap between it and the current position, plus description of the ‘next stage up’ from now]
3.5 Measuring progress
[Identified ‘indicator areas’ and associated indicators that will be used for measuring progress. Include information on data availability]
3.6 Recommendations and next steps
[How the assessment will inform national planning processes and other New Deal implementation efforts including the substance of a compact]

4. ANNEXES
[20 pages maximum]
4.1 Fragility Spectrum
[Copy of completed spectrum]
4.2 Summary of findings
[Write up of each workshop by PSG]