g7⁺

Note on the
Fragility Spectrum

Launched in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, 2013

About the g7+

The g7+ is a voluntary association of countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development. The main objective of the g7+ is to share experiences and learn from one another, and to advocate for reforms to the way the international community engages in conflict-affected states. To find out more about the g7+ visit www.g7plus.org

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1. Introduction

This note sets out the rationale and benefits of a 'spectrum approach' to fragility, and the purpose and use of country-specific fragility spectrums and indicators (developed through fragility assessments). It also discusses the utility of a consolidated fragility spectrum (see Annex 1) and a shared menu of indicators (see Annex 2). The paper first sets out the definitions of fragility and resilience agreed by the g7+ and discusses the benefits and use of the fragility spectrum tool. It then attempts to bring together into one place the rich material from countries that have already filled out country-specific spectrums and indicators through a consolidated fragility spectrum and menu of indicators. It also discusses how to avoid misusing these resources. Finally it sets out the descriptions of the stages of fragility across the spectrum as they are beginning to emerge. This document and these tools should be treated as a work in progress, to be continually updated as and when other member states complete fragility assessments.

2. The g7+ definition of fragility

State fragility is by its nature complex and different in every context. For this reason the g7+ adopted a broad definition of fragility at the Juba Ministerial Retreat in October 2011. This basic definition was affirmed at the Dubai Technical Meeting in May 2013:

> A state of fragility can be understood as a period of time during nationhood when sustainable socio-economic development requires greater emphasis on complementary peacebuilding and statebuilding activities such as building inclusive political settlements, security, justice, jobs, good management of resources, and accountable and fair service delivery.

This definition was chosen because it:

- Captures the key concerns of the g7+ and the diversity of our experiences of fragility; and
- Is purposely broad so that it covers the key areas where our countries need to be strengthened, but not does prescribe what weaknesses in these areas look like.

It should be noted that g7+ countries are not required to use this definition within their own fragility assessments or New Deal implementation activities. More specific definitions of fragility can be developed at the country level, to capture the ways in which fragility manifests differently in different contexts. Indeed, in many countries, the term 'fragility' is itself highly controversial, and many prefer to focus on 'resilience' as the positive inverse of fragility. Given this, the g7+ definition of fragility is intended as a marker to make clear how we perceive the challenges we face, but is not a binding prescription.

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3. Rationale and benefits of a spectrum approach to fragility

In addition to defining fragility, the g7+ also sought at the Dubai Technical Meeting to set out what it meant by resilience – the end point that states in fragile situations are working towards. To that end, the following understanding of resilience, and its relation to fragility, was agreed in Dubai:

> Resilience refers to the ability of social institutions to absorb and adapt to the internal and external shocks and setbacks they are likely to face. Fragility thus implies that the consolidation of nationhood, and the safety, security and well being of the citizens are at risk of a relapse into crisis or violent conflict. This risk is gradually reduced as the institutions develop the necessary ability to cope with the type of threats they are exposed to.

These definitions of fragility and resilience, agreed by the g7+, can assist in providing a broad understanding of the challenges that fragile states share, and the goal that they are trying to achieve.

Countries in fragile situations differ in nature and are at different stages of progress due to the different drivers of fragility and resilience in each country. There are several challenges in current approaches to fragility which the members of the g7+ want to avoid. A key concern of the g7+ is the measurement and categorisation of fragile states according to donor monitoring frameworks, which try to assess the nature of their situations with a standard yardstick. Furthermore, difficulties around data collection in fragile states mean donors often rely on out of date statistics. Misrepresentations can result, which fail to provide an accurate picture of the progress that states are making. There is also an issue of creating overly ambitious international targets and goals for fragile states that do not take into account the low base from which fragile states are starting, and thus 'set countries up to fail' against these measures. Finally, indicators determined by international actors do not draw on the true experts on fragility – the citizens of fragile states themselves.

All these issues can serve to ferment disillusionment amongst citizens of fragile states, who are led to believe that little progress is being made by their governments, and can undermine state-society relations in a potentially destabilising way. Instead, an approach to monitoring progress that can measure and acknowledge small, early steps in the right direction helps 'set countries up to succeed', and builds confidence and trust between citizens and governments.

There is thus a clear need for monitoring frameworks that are more attuned to the realities of fragile contexts and that take account of the stage

Some benefits of the spectrum approach to fragility

The Fragility Spectrum:

- Is a diagnostic tool, drawing on local knowledge, to facilitate a self-assessment process that helps a country to understand its current position in the overall transition process, and to adjust its planning to the needs of that specific stage;

- Enables a more nuanced approach to the PSGs. It helps countries to consider how best to pursue the PSGs in the specific stage they may find themselves in, and to avoid pursuing ideal-type goals;

- Aims to track incremental progress, and to assist countries in the development of their own targets and goals, while at the same time providing an overview of the overall path towards resilience. This is instead of merely judging progress from an ideal end-state;

- Can help governments, civil society and donors to focus their attention on context-specific indicators – as opposed to the common indicators, which is a risk that was identified in the g7+ Position Paper on Common Indicators. It will help to ensure that the indicators identified are not only country specific, but are also chosen with a particular stage in the fragility spectrum in mind. In this way, governments, civil society and donors will monitor their progress against a more realistic set of stage-specific expectations, as well as enable them to track movement from stage to stage across the spectrum. The stage specific indicators will also enable the donors and the government to focus on the input or resources needed to advance the country to the next stage of development;

- Can also support peer learning between g7+ countries, both on ways of measuring progress across the stages and the PSGs, and on developing strategies for advancing on particular issues in particular stages of fragility. A country that has already moved one stage up may be able to assist the thinking in a peer g7+ country that is still struggling with similar issues at a lower stage; and

- Offers an opportunity for understanding and monitoring of fragility to be determined by fragile states themselves, sensitive to the diversity of experiences of fragility and to the varied paths that countries can take to achieve resilience.

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of fragility a country is in. Fragile states themselves are best positioned to develop such frameworks, familiar as they are with both their strengths and weaknesses.

The fragility spectrum was thus proposed as a tool to enable countries themselves to analyse and describe the unique nature of their fragility according to a number of 'stages' across each Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal; and to provide a set of appropriate indicators that they can draw on to measure and demonstrate progress, and to assist them in moving out of fragility.

Importantly, the Fragility Spectrum has been developed by fragile states, for fragile states. This means that it is owned by the very countries that are to use it. The spectrum can be used as a mechanism to encourage political dialogue within a

country, and can also facilitate peer-learning across countries. The bottom-up process means that the country-specific fragility spectrums draw on the wealth of experience of fragile states themselves in understanding what fragility and progress look like. This is practically more useful and realistic than 'ideal type' conditions developed by experts that often do not reflect the realities in fragile states.

The fragility spectrum approach to understanding fragility is thus intended as a counterweight to donor- and expert-led efforts to classify and measure fragile states. The fragility spectrum is intended to put fragile states themselves – their governments and civil society – in the driving seat in terms of articulating what fragility has looked like, and continues to look like, in their experience and how to move to the next stage of resilience. Fragility is experienced differently in different country contexts

4. Development of country-specific fragility spectrums and indicators

as well as in different stages of a country's path to resilience. These differences should be reflected in the strategies designed to support transition out of fragility.

Initial drafts of the Fragility Spectrum were developed in early 2012, at g7+ technical meetings in Dili and Copenhagen, but it was decided that the best way to generate descriptions of the different stages of fragility was through the pilot fragility assessments. Through discussions at the country level, blank fragility spectrums would be filled in, providing the content in a bottom-up, rather than top-down manner. Fragility assessments were undertaken in five g7+ countries (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste). These country-specific spectrums provide country-owned and -led descriptions of what fragility has looked like in their experience.

Figure 1: Country-specific fragility spectrum

	Stage 1: Crisis	Stage 2: Rebuild and Re-form	Stage 3: Transition	Stage 4: Transfor-mation	Stage 5: Resilience	Indica-tors to measure progress
PSG 1: Inclusive politics	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country indicators
PSG 2: Security	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country indicators
PSG 3: Justice	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country indicators
PSG 4: Economic Foundations	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country indicators
PSG 5: Revenues & Services	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country description	Country indicators

5. The development of the consolidated fragility spectrum and menu of indicators

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding has provided guidance on conducting fragility assessments. In brief, the process involved holding an inclusive fragility assessment in which national participants fill out a blank fragility spectrum, based on their understanding of what the various stages of fragility (Crisis, Rebuild and Reform, Transition, Transformation, and Resilience) look like across the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal areas (Inclusive Politics, Security, Justice, Economic Foundations and Revenues & Services). In addition, fragility assessment participants discussed the kinds of indicators that they feel are important to measure progress to the next stage. The result of the fragility assessments is a completed country-specific fragility spectrum and list of indicators, as depicted in Figure 1. In reality, many countries that conducted the assessment concentrated on filling in three of the five stages, representing 1) the crisis stage, 2) the stage where the country is now, and 3) what the 'resilience' stage looks like.

In an effort to capture the richness of these country-specific spectrums in one document that can be shared with others, the g7+ Secretariat has compiled the descriptions from the country-specific spectrums into a 'draft consolidated fragility spectrum'. This has been further refined by g7+ focal points, at the Dubai Technical Meeting in May 2013. This draft consolidated fragility spectrum can be found in annex I. In addition, the indicators proposed during the fragility assessments were collated into a long list of approximately 300 indicators. These form the basis for a 'draft menu of indicators' that other countries can draw on in selecting indicators to measure their own progress. This draft menu of indicators can be found in annex II.

The process of preparing the consolidated fragility spectrum and the menu of indicators is shown in figure 2. Both the consolidated spectrum and the menu of indicators are living documents that will be further refined and added to, by the g7+, as more fragility assessments are conducted. However, it will be challenging to identify commonalities and differences between the country-specific fragility spectrums and indicator lists on the basis of just five fragility assessments. Only when a wider catalogue of spectrums and indicator lists are compiled will it be possible to truly understand similarities and differences across fragile states.

As further countries complete fragility assessments, the g7+ Secretariat will, with their permission, integrate the descriptions and indicators emerging from these assessments into the consolidated spectrum and menu of indicators. In this way, both the consolidated spectrum and indicators menu will continue to be living documents, constantly

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Figure 2: How fragility assessments feed into the consolidated fragility spectrum and menu of indicators

| Country fragility assessment 1 | Country fragility assessment 2 | Country fragility assessment 3 | Country fragility assessment 4 | Country fragility assessment 5 | | Country 1 indicator list | Country 2 indicator list | Country 3 indicator list | Country 4 indicator list | Country 5 indicator list |

Consolidated g7+ fragility spectrum

Menu of indicators

evolving to reflect the manner in which fragility is experienced in fragile states and the measures that fragile states feel are relevant in helping them progress to resilience.

In addition to compiling the consolidated fragility spectrum and menu of indicators, the g7+ Secretariat is undertaking an exploratory process of mapping the indicators (those which can logically fit in a specific stage) across the stages of fragility in the consolidated fragility spectrum. This will help to highlight the precise stages of fragility at which countries might find particular indicators useful and should assist in moderating the expectations of development partners in understanding what realistic progress looks like throughout the transition

from fragility to resilience. For instance, countries in earlier stages of fragility may wish to emphasise more input or process indicators (measuring level of effort invested towards effective institutions and systems), while countries at intermediate stages may choose to focus on capacity indicators (measuring institutional performance) and countries at later stages may focus on outcome indicators. Again, the mapping of indicators will not be prescriptive and countries can select indicators at whatever stage of fragility is relevant to their own experience of fragility. However, the mapping of the menu of indicators against the stages of fragility may be a useful guide and source of inspiration, as well as enabling peer-learning.

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6. The use of the consolidated spectrum and menu of indicators in fragility assessments

Countries undertaking fragility assessments should continue to utilise the guidance on fragility assessments provided by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. That is, they should continue to complete a blank fragility spectrum by filling in their own descriptions of fragility as relevant to their country's experience. Similarly, countries should develop a set of indicators that is most appropriate for measuring those areas that are found to be most critical in moving towards resilience in their particular country.

In doing so, the consolidated fragility spectrum and the menu of indicators will be available as resources to refer to and draw upon if useful. It is important to note, however, that it is not a requirement that countries use either document. In selecting indicators, for instance, countries may find it helpful to have a menu of indicators that other fragile states have found useful in measuring their own progress. In this way, the consolidated fragility spectrum and menu of indicators are information sharing tools that are in no way prescriptive in the fragility assessment process.

7. Avoiding misuse of the country-specific and consolidated fragility spectrums

The fragility spectrum is a qualitative tool, not a quantitative one. The fragility spectrum is designed as a qualitative tool that attempts to understand the specific stage a country may be in, taking into account the overall transition process underway. There is a risk, however, that the spectrum may be seen as a quantitative tool, particularly by international partners. It is important to continue to emphasize that the fragility spectrum is predominantly a tool for internal benchmarking and it is not intended to rank countries at a particular level. Similarly, a country should also not be placed wholly at one level. Most countries will not fit neatly into one specific stage in the fragility spectrum, and even within a single PSG countries may be in different stages for different dimensions. The strength of the fragility spectrum lies in assessing the different dimensions and increasing sensitivity to the linkages between them, which will get lost if countries are placed wholly in one particular stage. For the same reasons, the different stages should not be assessed using standard quantitative indicators (e.g. 'countries with X number of violent deaths are in the crisis stage, and countries with Y number of violent deaths are in the rebuild and reform stage').

The consolidated fragility spectrum is a resource, not a blueprint. The fragility spectrum does not intend to reduce countries to generic stages of fragility, as the way in which one country experiences stage 3 (transition) for example, may be very different to the way other countries experience it. For this reason, it is important that countries conducting fragility assessments start with a blank matrix and only use the consolidated fragility spectrum as a conceptual tool to understand the stages and that can be drawn on where countries feel it is useful. Those engaged

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in this process should not see the consolidated spectrum as a predictive or prescriptive model to fit their country into. The fragility spectrum approach to fragility is intended to facilitate the process of thinking in terms of stages, and of matching country-specific lists of indicators to the particular stage a country find itself in. In doing so, the consolidated spectrum may be a useful resource for countries to refer to.

A transition from fragility to resilience is not always linear, and relapses may occur. It should also not be assumed that transitions are naturally progressive, and that one stage will naturally or automatically lead to the rest. Relapse is common, and countries can easily be trapped in a stage for a long period of time. The fragility spectrum should be used as a way to visualise these trajectories, not to punish countries for relapses.

8. Description of each stage of fragility

As five fragility assessments have now been undertaken, it is possible to begin to assemble from the country-specific fragility spectrums that they produced, broad descriptions of each stage of the five stages of fragility. While it is not possible to capture the richness and detail of the descriptions of each stage of fragility that the consolidated fragility spectrum provides (see Annex I), below an effort has been made to set out the basic features of the five stages of fragility, drawing on the descriptions provided in the fragility assessments undertaken to date. These, again, should not be seen as prescriptive but as a suggestion emerging out of the fragility assessments already completed. It is also important to note that whilst each phase has particular characteristics that might help to define the stage as a whole, the boundaries between stages cannot be clearly demarcated, both from a temporal perspective but also across different PSGs. These descriptions will be also be a 'living document', to be added to and refined as further fragility assessments are undertaken.

Stage 1: Crisis

A situation of crisis can refer to the period where there is acute instability in a country, with increased levels of violent conflict, the potential for a lapse into more generalised violent conflict, or where there has been a natural or manmade disaster. Frequently in this period, there are major political divisions and often conflict amongst communities, leading to widespread mistrust and fear. The security forces may be committing widespread human rights abuses and perpetrating endemic corruption, and consequently there is lack of public confidence in the security institutions. The security sector is typically fragmented and often in the

process of being reformed. Rule of law is typically eroded and politicized and the economic sector is severely constrained. During this phase, justice institutions often only exist at a national level, and not at the local or regional level, and the country faces many human rights violations not addressed by the state. Due justice processes become less well followed and violence as a means to settle disputes is resorted to more frequently. Basic government services are likely to be weak or have ceased to exist, and the international humanitarian and aid community may have stepped in to provide emergency relief. International Institutions may also be providing security support in the form of police or peacekeeping missions. Government revenues are often low or non-existent, and countries often face illegal or informal exploitation of natural resources and weak enforcement of regulations of natural resources management.

Stage 2: Rebuild & Reform

During this phase, renewed efforts towards political dialogue to resolve political differences may be in evidence. However, there is often inequitable power sharing between groups. Some progress can be seen on disarmament processes, but security issues remain a challenge for the country's stability, with high proliferation of small arms. Institutions are often weak and inadequate, and deliver services sporadically to the population. As compared to the crisis phase, the intensity of conflict and political

disputes are more manageable and there are early efforts to establish stronger security institutions and recruitment of personnel. However, in this stage, security institutions performance is likely to remain weak. Justice institutions are starting to have a presence beyond national capitals but often are not effective and legislation is not effectively enforced. In relation to economic foundations, basic infrastructure and an enabling economic environment is beginning to be put in place but high unemployment rates are still to be found, particularly amongst the youth. During this phase, large potential sources of domestic revenue may have been identified (e.g. natural resources and/or customs), but these are poorly accounted for, benefiting only a small sector of the population. Whilst countries have started the process of reforming public financial management, budget execution problems remain, and accountability is weak.

Stage 3: Transition

This stage is often associated with the signature of agreements and an overall situation of stability. There is more space for formal dialogue between parties, which leads to the creation of institutions to support the dialogue process, including the existence of electoral institutions. Whilst there should be increased stability in the country, there is also the likely presence of corruption and challenges in working with strong opposition groups. There is often weak oversight capacity from the legislature.

In comparison to the previous phases, there is an increase in the quality, oversight and advocacy from civil society and some initial degree of free media. There may be an increased control of security by the state, although this continues to be weakened by lack of resources and capacity. Often, there is also an increased confidence in security and justice institutions, with a commensurate reduction in the use of violence to resolve disputes. Efforts to decentralize justice systems can be found, including the presence of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. During this stage, there may be increased access to basic infrastructure, but mainly in urban areas. Whilst government is most commonly still the largest employer, there are signs of more jobs being created in the private sector and an increase in government revenue, particularly from natural resources (if they exist), tax collection and other sources of revenue. Stronger basic services are provided, with an enhanced but poorly implemented regulatory framework.

Stage 4: Transformation

In the transformation stage, a country may have increased resilience within society, and conflicts are more often resolved peacefully. There is often a hosting of credible, non-violent and democratic political processes. Civil society begins to play an active role in political and societal debates, and increasingly good governance principles are adhered to. However, in this period there may also be a lack of public understanding of good governance principles. During this phase, the security situation has typically remained stable and peaceful for a considerable

amount of time, often for at least 5 years. More likely, one should encounter the presence of security personnel throughout the territory, but with limited numbers and capacity. Also, it is expected that there is increased public confidence in security institutions, and potential abuses are more frequently sanctioned. Economically, an enabling environment for business development may be found, with increased jobs opportunities, including in the private sector. Public institutions may be capable of better managing domestic revenues, through well-structure and coordinated tax and customs collection. Usually, there is an implementation of a decentralisation to expand access to basic services to the whole country.

Stage 5: Resilience

Resilience can be understood as the capacity of a society to deal with its challenges and to absorb shocks without relapsing into crisis. Every stage in the Fragility Spectrum represents growing resilience, but at this stage the resilience of the society has been institutionalised in its social customs, cultural practices, social contract and formal state institutions to the degree that a relapse into crisis is so unlikely that the country in question can no longer meaningfully be considered to be a post-conflict country. The focus thus shifts away from socio-political consolidation to long-

term social and economic development. During this period, political stability has been seen for a prolonged amount of time, often for more than 20 years, and the country should have created a strong culture of democracy and good governance. During this period, it is possible that the country has created a space for good understanding by the citizens of the political process. The government should be responsive in combating corruption, with transparent and inclusive processes. Fundamental rights are more likely to be upheld, and the roles of civil society should have been defined. Peace and security during this phase has prevailed for a long time. There should be sufficient security personnel throughout the country, and high level of confidence by the population. There is demonstrated political will to fight elite impunity, and widespread awareness of how the formal justice system operates. Good infrastructure connecting different parts of the country would be found, and private sector should now represent a large share of the labour market. Systems are likely to be in place for properly managing natural resources and government [probably generate enough revenue to provide essential services to its citizens. Public institutions function both at national and sub-national level, and the state increasingly becomes the main service provider for basic services.

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Annex 1: Consolidated fragility spectrum

The matrix below represents a compilation of the narrative descriptions of the five stages of fragility given in the fragility assessments of the five pilot countries (Sierra Leone, DRC, South Sudan, Liberia, Timor-Leste). This compilation of descriptions aims to provide an overview of the key issues pinpointed by the contributors to the fragility assessments in their country, and as such paints an image of the range of issues considered important at each

PSG 1: Inclusive Politics

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	Rebuild & Reform
Political Settlement	• No political dialogue amongst factions; • Factions are at war (not necessarily continuously); • There is breach of agreements reached; • Government might be forced to flee into exile; • Marginalization, forced displacement of certain groups; • Political and social and economic oppression; • Arbitrary killings; • Breakdown in centre- periphery/ capital-regional relations; • Elections are not held; • Power is based on force; • The state is not present throughout the country; • Traditional systems of governance have broken down; • Traditional systems of governance are the only form of governance working; • Lack of inclusive or agreed political settlement.	• Initiatives towards political dialogue to resolve political differences; • Lack of proper frameworks for consultations between groups; • Inequitable power sharing between groups; • Improving center -periphery relations; • Constitutional review started • Peacebuilding process initiated; • Service delivery by the government begins to expand beyond the capital; • Leaders are democratically elected; • Decentralisation efforts begin; • Accountability mechanisms are still relatively weak; • Improved international reputation and establishment of diplomatic representation.

stage. As these descriptions stem from the actual fragility assessments, there may be inconsistencies and gaps, reflecting the diversity of views and experiences between countries. Some stages are described more comprehensive than others, due to the fact that in fragility assessments participants have tended to focus on 'filling in' only three of the five stages of the spectrum (notably stages 1, 2 or 3, and 5).

As more countries conduct their fragility assessments, this matrix will continue to be updated as a work-in-progress. Over time, similarities and differences will emerge more clearly, and will start to give a good picture of what statebuilding and peacebuilding entails in practice, where similarities exist and where differences dominate.

Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• Formal dialogue between political parties exists; • A number of political dialogues have been conducted and agreements signed; • Peace Agreements are respected and implemented, and joint communiqués often signed between parties; • The situation is generally peaceful; • Institutions in place to support dialogue between political parties - but ongoing lack of constructive cooperation; • Political tolerance increased, including increased freedom of speech; • Division of competencies is clearly defined in the constitution but implementation is still weak; • Functional local governments.	• Instruments of government exist throughout the regions of the country; • Government officials are elected through a credible, non-violent and democratic political process.	• Strong degree of political freedom and tolerance; • Culture of democracy and good governance; • Existence of an institutionalized framework for peacebuilding, political dialogue and power sharing; • Clear separation of powers within government; • Agreed political settlement with traditional authorities, effectively capacitated local governments.

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PSG 1: Inclusive Politics

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	**Rebuild & Reform**
Political Processes and Institutions	• Majority of public community have no understanding of political processes; • Majority of public community do not feel free to participate in all political processes; • Basis for political, social and economic mobility often dependent on allegiances to an important figure rather than merit; • Tribal conflicts and political crises may persist; • Often there is the existence of external aggression; • Total institutional collapse. Institutions may exist but are dysfunctional; • No safe or open environment for political participation; • Governance neither inclusive nor participatory; • Parliament is dysfunctional and/or provisional. • There are no checks and balances on the executive. • Legislature and judiciary are not effective. • The constitution is not adhered to, or does not exist.	• People begin to understand political processes and are increasingly willing and able to engage; • Maintenance of ethno-regional or political imbalances in presidential, public and political appointments; • Gender imbalances persist; • Political intolerance and polarisation along regional, ethnic and political lines; • Provisional constitution exists; • Elected officials are weakly accountable to the electorate; • Dissenting voices often complain that ethnic or political groups monopolise state institutions; • Weak and inadequate institutions that deliver services only sporadically.
Societal Relationships	• Major political divisions and conflict amongst communities; • Widespread mistrust and fear; • Incidences of inter-tribal or political conflict; • Militias based along tribal or political lines; • Atrocities met with further atrocities. Civilian defence vigilante groups formed to fight rebels when state forces failed to do so; • Absence of law and order; • Efforts to reconcile are unsuccessful; • Lack of strong civil society organization, which is largely dormant. Some international organisations and local CSOs engaged in emergency relief efforts. • No press freedom or advocacy influence of civil society.	• Struggle for power and resources between groups resulting in clashes between groups; • Proliferation of small arms; • Disarmament is in progress; • CSOs are increasingly improving their service provision; • Safe environment for free speech and press freedom; • Lack of credible leaders in civil society with conflicts of interest; • Widespread corruption, politicisation of core services and monetisation of politics.

Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• People begin to feel confident about participating in political processes including political parties and elections;	• Free and fair elections are held regularly;	• Citizens have good understanding of the political process and are free to participate in any political process;
• Elements of corruption are still present;	• Society generally free to express political allegiances;	• The government is responsive and active in fighting corruption and building strong and merit-based institutions.
• People in national governments can be using power to favour their tribal group/area or political party;	• Credible national Electoral Institutions (e.g. Commission);	• Effective oversight institutions are created, providing effective checks and balance;
• Political parties exist, have rights to exist and are registered;	• Political parties may develop manifestoes and adhere to national electoral commission rules and guidance;	• Government is responsive, transparent and inclusive;
• Lack of sizeable opposition can limit checks and balances;	• Key institutions are in place and function effectively, including an Anti-Corruption Commission, Office of the Ombudsman, Office of National Security, Commercial Court, Open Government Initiative, Independent Media Commission;	• Strong actions towards affirmative action for women and marginalised groups;
• Legislative often is still not fully accountable to the electorate;		• Well-capacitated institutions in place to ensure respect for due process.
• Weak oversight capacity in the legislature;		
• Regulatory structures and independent oversight bodies in place but limited in effectiveness.	• Good governance principles adhered to but overall lack of public understanding.	
• Basic political systems, processes and institutions of state are established but still face capacity constraints in delivering services, especially outside the capital city;		
• Political, legal and administrative reforms conducted but not fully implemented or enforced and capacity and performance of institutions is low.		
• Government able to control social groups' activities;	• Civil society begins to play an active role in political and societal debates and reforms;	• Friendly relationship amongst social groups within society;
• Increase in CSOs and improved quality, oversight and advocacy;	• Groups respect each other within society.	• Fundamental liberties are upheld, society is free from intimidation and victimisation and tolerance crosses social divides;
• Vibrant media but not totally free and heavily biased politically;		• CSO work freely, have access to funding and have strong advocacy functions;
• Widespread corruption, politicisation of core services and monetisation of politics;		• Role of civil society in terms of its participation, monitoring and decision-making has been defined;
• Political interference by non-state actors.		

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PSG 2: Security

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	Rebuild & Reform
Security Conditions	• Large-scale and prevailing continuous conflict and non-governed spaces that the state cannot control; • Gross and large-scale violations of human rights and atrocities committed against citizens; • Political regime abuses their authority over the security forces; • Restricted freedom of movement; • Widespread civil militia; • High levels of criminal activities, including stealing, raping and abductions; • Bombardments or other major attacks; • Food insecurity and famine prevalent; • Blurred boundaries between political or military violence and civilian criminal violence; • Prevalence of conflict at the border ; • Porous borders and instability in the border region; • Repercussions of conflict across borders, such as through the inflow of arms and refugees; • High prevalence of illegal economic activity (illegal mining, smuggling and other criminal economic activities).	• The intensity of conflict and political violence is manageable, as compared to crisis stage; • The availability of arms is destabilizing
Capacity and accountability of security sector institutions	• Youth formed auxiliary armies and widespread militias; • Size of the security institutions is huge, but resources are limited; • Extensive privatisation of security services due to absence of state-provided security; • Security sector recruitment is not based on merit; • No civilian oversight over the security sector; • Security sector is controlled either by unaccountable government or warring factions; • International security forces in place.	• Beginning to establish security institutions and recruitment of security personnel; • Limited interaction of security sector with the legislature, culture of autonomy persists; • No public complaints mechanisms; • Role of international security forces is limited, mostly national provision of security.

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Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• State begins to control the security situation; • Negotiation begins to resolve potential border disputes;	• The security situation has remained peaceful and stable for around 5 years; • Overall peace, only sporadic clashes; • Central government in control of national security; • Reduced vulnerability to incitement; • Persistence or increase in armed robbery and rape, especially in urban areas; • Proliferation of small arms trafficking; • Agreements being made on border cooperation; • Effective partnerships through regional security initiatives.	• Peace and security prevail for long time; • Development of a framework for border regulation and fight against bribes; • Creation of jobs for youth and capacity building; • Improvement of literacy levels; • Joint regular controls at the borders to ensure maximum security; • Mechanisms in place for intelligence sharing in the region.
• The presence of security institutions is still limited in numbers and not widely present; • Security services have limited reach and depend on informal local security in rural areas; • Significant vigilanteeism; • The authority on security has been handed over to National police forces, although with limited resources; • Some security sector reform is beginning; • Prisons still overcrowded, some women and juvenile detention facilities available; • Joint cross-sector working groups in place and operational.	• The presence of security personnel at all districts but still limited in number; • National police forces capable of controlling the situation in entire territory; • State is dealing with integration of private militia.	• Sufficient security personnel and their presence felt in the entire country; • Discipline and rationalisation of the army; • Professionalisation of security institutions and personnel implemented, including establishing criteria for promotion and recruitment based on merit.

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PSG 2: Security

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	Rebuild & Reform
Performance of Security Sector Institutions	• Lack of public confidence in the security institutions; • Poor public perception of the security sector, army and police posing as rebels; • Widespread human rights abuses by the security sector and complete impunity due to institutional weakness and political interference; • High levels of police brutality and arbitrary fines; • Endemic corruption across the security sector.	• Lack of clear distinct mandates between different security organisations • Security organisations are not responsive; • Many citizens continue to rely upon chiefdom informal police for resolving their matters; • Insufficient salaries of police, leading to corruption.

Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• The public begins to have confidence in the security institutions; • Armed forces externally oriented and well disciplined; • Improved trust in the police with stronger police-community relations; • Fears regarding politicisation of the police and petty corruption and heavy handed responses continue; • Security sector slow response times; • Some action is taken against security personnel who commit crime; • Increased charges to police misconduct, resulting in demotion, dismissal, suspension and arrest; • Lack of charges where police misconduct are protected by powerful political figures; • Local authorities and security personnel begin to control and resolve conflict at community level.	• Public confidence on the security institutions has increased; • Most of the security personnel that commit crime are sanctioned accordingly to the existing criminal laws.	• Communities have full confidence in the security institutions; • Policy has the capacity to deal with local crime and other emerging security threats such as cyber war and drug trafficking; • Police are responsive to public grievances and allow peaceful demonstrations; • Police training includes specialist training in human rights and peaceful crowd control; • Security sector is adequately equipped and paid, particularly in the provinces; • Recruitment is based on merit rather than tribal and political interests; • All security personnel that commit crime are sanctioned according to the existing laws; • Security institutions can respond immediately and efficiently to cases reported; • Citizen oversight mechanisms established to check the conduct of security personnel;

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PSG 3: Justice

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	Rebuild & Reform
Justice Conditions	• Justice institutions only exist at national level; • Selective and preferential justice: 'might is right'; • Lengthy justice processes, leading to long delays; • Lack of access to justice; • High levels of corruption within the justice system; • Elites are not sanctioned even when they commit crimes or breach the law; • Many human rights violation cases not being addressed by the state.	• Justice institutions (such as district courts) are present in some districts but still ineffective; • A transitional justice mechanism is established, such as a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to look at human rights violations committed in the past; • Increased awareness of human rights and institutional improvements; • Limited support to vulnerable victims; • Council of traditional leaders coexisting with the state judiciary.

Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• Justice institutions in some districts have begun to function effectively;	• Some human rights violation cases are resolved;	• Courts are present in all districts and all public community have access to judicial assistance with more effectiveness and efficiency;
• Efforts to decentralize formal systems is in place;		• Human rights violation cases are being tried and resolved;
• Regular circuit court sittings and paralegals appointed;		• Support for victims and survivors;
• Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are in place, supported by legislation. These are more affordable, timely and accessible although concerns remain about mainstreaming and harmonization of court rulings;		• Customary legal system continues but is properly regulated and harmonised into national judicial system;
• Limited access to representation (legal aid);		• Traditional authorities empowered and effective in settling disputes at the local level;
• Ignorance of formal system remains high and significant delays are common;		• All local conflicts can be resolved through formal justice system.
• Some high profile prosecutions have been done, but perception of political interference in justice remains high;		
• Human rights organizations have made it possible for elites to face justice;		
• Implementation of the truth and reconciliation commission recommendations;		
• Traditional institutions for dispute resolution in matters relating to land issues is being mostly used;		
• Laws relating to natural resource management in place but with limited enforcement.		

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PSG 3: Justice

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	Rebuild & Reform
Capacity and accountability of security sector institutions	• The capacity of national justice personnel is still very low; • Inadequate resourcing, skills and systems, no record keeping; • The police and ministry of interior lack the qualifications and skills to adequately dispense justice; • Counties lack judges, making access to justice difficult; • Lack of infrastructure, particularly at the county level where there are not enough facilities; • Corruption is rife.	• Justice sector reform process is developing human and physical capacities, but there are still delays in justice due to lack of sufficient magistrate court sittings; • More legal practitioners, but many local court staff are still lacking in capacity; • Insufficient remuneration and facilitation for justice institutions; • High prison overcrowding and lack of reprimand homes for juveniles.
Performance of Justice Institutions	• The state has not ratified any international norms; • Law based on decree rather than due process; • Customary laws are not codified and no alignment or interface between systems; • There are very few cases where high-profile people have been brought to justice (e.g. for corruption); • Interference of the executive in the affairs of the justice system; • Traditional authorities and customary justice systems used unsupervised; • Justice depends on one's hierarchy within the political system; • Military law applied in some areas; • Abuse of power by judges, lawyers and local court officials result in zero confidence in the system; • People do not trust the government, state institutions or political authorities to use justice systems; • Justice systems completely disrupted by war, particularly outside the capital; • Sham trials for alleged, failed and actual coups accompanied by executions; • Frequent resorting to violence to settle scores and resolve disputes.	• Some international norms have been ratified but still not taken into consideration in the implementation; • No effective laws to protect the vulnerable groups including women, disabled, minorities, the elderly; • Legislation not effectively enforced; • Limited due process; • Arbitrary arrests still common.

Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• Local judicial actors are in the lead in justice institutions; • The state creates legal framework to support the role of the traditional justice in rural areas; • Improved reconciliation and dispute resolution; • Numerous dispute resolution options including formal police and judiciary, alternative dispute resolution, paralegals, Local Courts, chiefdom arbitrations.		• The justice sector is all run by qualified nationals actors; • Well capacitated, and modern justice institutions; • Reduced overcrowding in prisons; • The remuneration system encourages staff to relocate to the districts
• Most international instruments that have been ratified are applied; • Law reform process established but slow progress; • Citizens and legal actors frequently unaware of updated laws; • Limited codification of customary law, and unclear if codification will make customary law less arbitrary because of regional differences; • Little effective partnership between customary and formal systems; • Magistrates allowed too much discretion, insufficient guidelines; • Public confidence in the judicial system has increased; • Right of the people are protected and human rights violations prosecuted; • The use of violence to resolve disputes is reducing.	• Numerous new/updated laws, international standards introduced and domesticated; • Antiquated laws still on the books but plans in place to update them.	• International norms serve as a guide for decision-making; • Decisions are based on existing international norms; • There is demonstrated political will to fight impunity; • Case backlogs are being cleared; • Independence and accountability of the Judiciary is established within the constitution; • Laws protecting vulnerable groups in place; • The judicial institutions reach out to the public to educate then about the law; • The public have full confidence in the judicial institution; • There is widespread awareness on how the formal justice system operates.

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PSG 4: Economic Foundations

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	Rebuild & Reform
Economic Conditions	• Roads and power supplies either do not exist or are severely damaged; • Very little formal economic activity, even at the central level.	• Basic infrastructure is beginning to be put in place; • There are some economic activities but still concentrated mainly in the cities; • Porous borders and continued illegal cross-border flows; • Institutions that address criminal economic activity are limited and ineffective; • Limited economic opportunities; • Increasing GDP, but continued high level of poverty.
Jobs, livelihoods, and private sector development	• Most formal employment opportunities provided through humanitarian NGOs; • High reliance on expatriate labour; • High dependence on food imports; • Low agricultural productivity; • Little investment due to insecurity.	• High unemployment rate particularly amongst youth; • Government and development actors as the largest employer, and there are some systems in place for public sector recruitment; • High dependence of foreign capital and foreign workers in the private sector; • Domestic food production recommences, although dependency on food imports still high; • Enabling environment for business begins to exist; • Poor conditions for private sector development and limited access to finance; • Lack of appropriate skills to meet the needs of the labour market; • Rapid internal migration;

Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• Access to basic infrastructure (energy, roads, water) available, but mainly in urban areas; • Increased economic activities in urban areas beyond the capital city; • Economic activity dominated by agriculture or natural resources; • High trade deficit; • Basic financial institutions in place (commercial and central banks).	• Increased small business are established in the districts and local economies are boosted; • Enabling environment created for business development, including laws, regulations and macro-economic stability.	• The road network connects major population centres in the country; • Small towns are accessing markets and facilities for storing basic commodities; • Poverty rate are falling steadily; • Exports increasing; • Some ability to manage external economic and financial shocks.
• The creation of more private sectors job opportunities, with government as continuing as the largest employer; • Continued high unemployment particularly among youth; • Large informal and casual sector and poor employment conditions; • Growing domestic food production; • Improvement in the business environment and active efforts to attract FDI.	• Increased job opportunities across the country, including at the regional level; • Steady increase in Foreign Direct Investment; • Enabling business environment established.	• Private sector represents a large share of the labour market; • Skills training and employment opportunities have increased, especially for youth; • Growth in entrepreneurial activity; • Increase in value-added agricultural production, for domestic and export markets.

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PSG 4: Economic Foundations

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	Rebuild & Reform
Exploitation of Natural Resource	• Illegal or informal exploitation of natural resources; • Limited formal exploitation of natural resources; • Weak enforcement of regulations for natural resource management.	• Unequal distribution of resource wealth and limited local involvement in resource management; • Starting to establish the legal framework and institutions for resource management (e.g. Petroleum law, mining laws, regulatory agencies etc.); • Lack of appropriate skills to effectively manage natural resources within government.

PSG 5: Revenue and Services

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	Rebuild & Reform
Revenue Generation	• Government revenues are low or non-existent; • Customs processes interrupted and non-functional; • Absence of public institutions for collection of domestic revenues.	• Domestic revenues highly dependent on natural resources and/or customs, although benefitting the elite; • Collection of revenue is improving and it is being documented, however with problems; • Legal framework improving but poorly enforced; • The establishment of revenue management institutions, with limited capacity; • Poor accountability and responsiveness of revenues services.

Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• Land policy and land laws in place; • Lack of data availability on resource endowment to better plan resource management.	• More national experts involved in the extractive sectors and increased cross-government capacity to negotiate, review and enforce contracts; • Increased transparency in revenue collection; • Contracts in place, but limited success in ensuring the country can appropriate maximum benefit; • Value-addition still very low, resources are extracted but not processed locally.	• Systems in place for managing natural resources; • Environment protection agency exists for monitoring and environment impact assessments and social assessments; • Value addition taking place within country (e.g. oil refinery, processing); • Effective systems in place for sharing resource rents, including with local communities.

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Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• In resource-rich countries, revenues from natural resources starts to increase, while non-resource revenues remain low; • Revenues from natural resources increasingly finance government programmes; • Tax collection and compliance increasing especially in urban areas, as a result of reforms in tax administration; • Tax evasion, particularly in cross-border trade; • High dependence on technical assistance for tax administration; • New sources of tax revenue introduced; • Increased tax awareness and compliance;	• In resource-rich countries, improved balance between non-resource and resource revenues; • Public institutions and staff are capable of managing domestic revenues; • Tax and customs collection now well-structured and coordinated; • Over-issuance of tax waivers can undermine revenue generation.	• Government generates enough revenue to provide essential services to citizens; • Sound institutional framework for managing and tracking natural resource revenues; • Improved transparency and accountability for resource revenues; • Tax exemptions are rationalized according to actual benefits versus revenues forgone; • Clear and efficient division of tax responsibilities.

PSG 5: Revenue and Services

Dimension	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	**Rebuild & Reform**
Public Administration	• Weak public finance management, including procurement systems; • Limited skilled personnel or systems in place; • Procedures not followed, no enforcement of guidelines; • Lack of transparency and accountability; • Lack of decentralization of Public Finance Management functions; • Weak or non-existent capacity of public administration institutions; • 'Personalisation' of government and its services undermines the state's ability to utilise resources and collect taxes.	• Public finance management reforms begin to be identified and implemented; Budget execution problems remain as agencies have challenges in following budgets, with increased extra-budgetary expenditures; • Anti-Corruption Commission has been established with robust prosecutorial powers, but lacks skilled staff • Civil service poorly remunerated, weak and politicised, depleted in numbers and quality; • Corruption, collusion and nepotism still dominate;

Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• Legal framework for public finance starts to be implemented;	• Improvements in performance of civil servants;	• Public financial management systems and control mechanisms functioning well;
• Disciplinary system for civil servants has been introduced, administrative sanctions are applied to non-performing civil servants;	• Civil service size is appropriate and has strong administrative and planning processes;	• Strengthened budget discipline;
• Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), expenditure controls, audit and accounting systems in place to report on government expenditure;	• Better use of internet and communication technology in public administration to promote transparency and accountability;	• Strengthened intergovernmental fiscal transfer system to sub-national level;
• Improvements in budget execution process, budget oversight committees and monitoring of national public procurement processes;	• Significant progress in privatization of state owned enterprises.	• Well trained and better performing civil servants with good terms and conditions;
• Decentralisation of public finance management with budget and procurement committees at the sub-national levels;		• Civil service commission functions independently;
• Civil society scrutiny of public finance management;		• Improved freedom of information;
• National procurement legislation established, though procurement capacities are still weak;		• Public institutions function well both at national and sub-national levels.
• Number and capacities of civil servants begin to improve.		

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PSG 5: Revenue and Services

Dimen-sion	Fragility Stage	
	Crisis	**Rebuild & Reform**
	• The state does not play a strong role in the provision of public services, with international organisations dominating this area;	• Many people still lack access to basic services such as clean water, electricity, education and health care;
	• Widespread lack of access to necessary basic services;	• Significant inequalities and regional imbalances in core service delivery;
	• High inequalities exist;	• Development plan in place, with relevant policies being developed;
	• Systematic erosion of state institutions and systems of regulation through rent-seeking activities to ensure regime survival;	• Significant progress in the delivery of basic services although this is still largely donor funded. NGOs deliver some core services with government oversight;
	• No proper regulatory frameworks for service delivery in place;	
	• Breakdown of law and order meant that even where policies were in place they were not enforced;	• An increase in the number of skilled personnel, but challenges remain as skill levels do not match needs;
	• Resources, skills and facilities required for effective service delivery were absent and very little worked;	
	• Most basic services that exist are concentrated in the capital city;	• Facilities remain basic;
	• Services largely delivered through patronage networks.	• Limited capacity and resources in local councils to deliver local services.

Transition	Transformation	Resilience
• The state begins to provide some basic services, although the international organizations continue to implement some programs;	• Implementation of decentralization to increase access to basic services to the whole country.	• The state is the main service provider in the country, for all basic services;
• Numerous international instruments agreed but localisation and implementation is slow;		• Sufficient budget allocation for services delivery to meet basic services;
• Regulatory framework is greatly enhanced but limited efficiency;		• Majority of population have access to basic services;
• Development of policies on services aiming for equal distribution and access, with services provision expanding into districts.		• Share of expenditure for basic services has increased;
• Public expenditure shifting to focus more on social services, and less on infrastructure;		• Strong policy frameworks;
		• Better use of statistics to target services;
		• Political processes result in benefit for all of society;

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Annex 2: Menu of indicators

The following table represents a compilation of the indicators that were identified by the five pilot countries. This Menu of Indicators provide countries an opportunity to identify those indicators that could be of use in while conducting their fragility assessment fragility spectrum, and serve as a source of inspiration for putting together their own country-specific basket of indicators. The following indicators are expected to serve as a reference point, rather than being a prescription on which indicators should be used by countries for their fragility assessments.

The indicators presented below stem from the fragility assessments from the five pilot countries. Some minor reordering has taken place, and duplications removed. At the time of publishing of this document, some countries have not yet validated their indicators, and for this reason the countries from which these indicators were formulated are not mentioned. Not all indicators

presented here will indeed be measured by these countries, as country-specific baskets of indicators still need to be made in most of these countries. Over time, more and more countries will start to use (some of these) indicators to monitor progress on the Peacebuildling and Statebuilding Goals. As more countries conduct their fragility assessments and develop other indicators, this menu will continue to grow. This menu therefore needs to be seen as a work in progress.

Please note that some descriptions below are not yet presented as 'indicators', but rather as 'target areas' that would still require further work to be developed into indicators that are measurable. The most obvious ones are followed with the word (target) in brackets, but many others will also require further technical work before they become fully measurable. This type of technical work will need to be done at country-level, in close collaboration with the statistical offices on the ground.

PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 1: Inclusive Politics	Political Settlement	• The existence of institution oversee peace process and political dialogue • % of provisions of political settlements honoured and implemented • Respect of all signed agreements (target) • Decrease in the number of hotbeds of conflict – across all regions (target) • Incidence of political clashes • Number of inter-political party(or political motivated classes • The institutions of the Republic work regularly. (target) • Increasing number of diplomatic meetings. • Number of legal claims from individual or organization against state on violation on division of power to the court
		• Election law in compliance with the Constitution • Holding of municipal and chieftaincy elections • Effective redress mechanism for election violence and violation of electoral rights (target) • % Satisfaction with election results • Incidence of political petition of election results
		• Presence of different political parties in opposition area • Diversity in representation in key-decision making bodies • Perception of diversity in representation in key decision-making bodies • Level of active participation of civil society in peacebuilding and statebuilding actions and activities
		• A national reconciliation institution established • National reconciliation policy and plan formulated • Land policy formulated and land laws revised • Customary and statutory laws harmonized • Service Charters for integrity in local government service delivery established and implemented at county, city and district levels
		• # of national reconciliation dialogues established and functional • # of national reconciliation issues addressed • # of land disputes successfully concluded by land commission • # of land issues investigated • # of religious conflict mediated and resolved • # of ethnic conflict mediated and transformed • # of regional service delivery systems planned, constructed and fully operational • # of community policing forums established and fully functional at district and county levels

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PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 1: Inclusive Politics	Political processes and institutions	• Clear separation of powers / institutions work independently. [target] • Existence of legislative mechanisms to ensure the independence of the state institutions supporting democracy. [target] • Adequate institutional control mechanisms. [target]
		• Degree of participation in elections and other political processes [target] • Level of satisfaction with the quality of the election process • % of registered voters who actually voted • Participation rate in elections by district
		• Access to political sphere for candidates and voters [target] • # of opposition political actors holding governmental positions • District and Regional representation of political parties • Number of political parties represented at local councils • # of law initiatives from the opposition party that being approved by the Parliament • # of Private member bill introduce and pass in parliament
		• # of cabinet, legislative seats, judiciary officials differentiated by gender, geographical representation and minorities • % of vulnerable groups who hold public office
		• Existence of a compact on engagement of key national stakeholders [civil society, private sector] for national decision making • Number of persons participating in civic education exercises on political process • Process of parliamentary scrutiny in budget process [target] • Index for maximum feasible participation of citizens in policy formulation, resource management and other national decision making processes established and adhered to [target]
		• Number of Independent Media Outlets/ organisations registered • Number of Human Rights abuse cases reported to the HRC office of the Ombudsman, etc.

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PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 2: Security	Security conditions	• Perception of security conditions / % of public perception (disaggregated by gender) who feel safe
		• Violent deaths per 100,000 population • Major and minor assaults per 100,000 population • Number of civilian deaths post war. • % of crime rate; (rape, murder, armed robbery, drug related offences) • Number of cases of sexual violence. / # of rape cases reported • Number of urban/peri-urban criminal offences committed. • Incidents of religious based violence • Number of active militias identified in the country. • Number of armed conflicts recorded during the year. • # of cross border security incidents • Number of cross-border raids recorded. • Number of cases (illegal trafficking and violence) occur in the border • # of security incidents at country level addressed by police officers at the regional level
		• Number of internally displaced people. • Number of strike actions recorded. • Number of deaths during public demonstrations. • Number of communal conflicts. • Number of land disputes. • Number of conflicts linked to the illegal exploitation of resources.
		• Quality of relations between civilians and the police/military. (target) • Level of police harassment. (target) • Number of complaints brought against the army or the police. • Number of people suffering harassment at borders

PSG Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 2: Security — Capacity and accountability of security sector institutions	• Security Service budget as a % of total budget / Share (%) of the budget allocated to the army, the police and the intelligence services.
	• Existence of a reference framework for the implementation of reforms in the police and judicial systems. • Number of pieces of legislation enacted in the security sector. • Number of measures taken to enforce passed laws. • Existence and implementation of strategic plans for the security sector, and regular monitoring of good execution (target) • Existence of a human resource management policy for the security sector / existence of training and career development programmes for security Personnel • Number of measures taken for youth supervision
	• # of security institutions adhering to budgetary and procurement standards / number of acquisitions of equipment according to procedures; • No of audited annual accounts received of CSOs and NGOs
	• Ratio of security personnel to population • Number of police officers per administrative divisions. • Number of police with tertiary education as of total national police • Number of training schools; • Number of trained officers and number of retrained people • # of institutions and personnel trained to achieve full territorial coverage (disaggregated by institution and sex) • Number of graduates recruited (quality of recruitment in the army). • Reduced prison overcrowding: Level of prison population, and number of prisons built; • Functioning sufficient equipment (transport and radio) by district / presence of inventory list
	• Existence of an instrument to receive, monitor and investigate complaints of security sector misconduct (target) • Criteria for vetting security personnel well documented and publicly available • Number of cases brought to court • Number of misconduct cases involving security personnel resulting in administration sanction and / or prosecution through the courts

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PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 2: Security	Performance of security sector institutions	• Number of pieces of legislation enacted in the security sector. • Number of measures taken to enforce enacted laws. • Number of laws made widely available. / number of awareness raising events held on legislation in the security sector.
		• % of Population Confident in Security Personnel delivering national security • % change in public perception of confidence in security sector • Perception of corruption of security forces / % of public perception of possibility to bribe security officers
		• % of public who have access to security services • Proportion of interventions on received calls. • Number of regulated public demonstrations taking place without any major incident.
		• Level of cross-border cooperation in the security sector. • Number of traffickers/smugglers arrested. • Number of marked/seized weapons. • Number of registered small arms in the hands of the public • Number of border services delivered • Number of refugees identified. • Number of reintegrated IDPs • Number of ex-combatants and reintegrated ex-combatants

PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 3: Justice	Justice conditions	• % trust in customary justice system, % trust in formal justice system • % of population who perceive they have access to justice • % of population aware of seeking redress and are confident in the justice system
		• Number of prosecuted and punished cases of corruption in the judiciary • Number of documented cases of corruption in the judiciary that are sanctioned by law. Number of prosecuted and punished offenders among the elite. • Number of cases involve state actors and public figure being processed and prosecuted by court • Number of cases of arbitrariness recorded over the last 5 years.
		• Number of criminals responsible for rapes and atrocities who are prosecuted and punished. • Number of human right violation cases that being resolved • # of indigents who receive free legal services • # / % of Human Rights cases tried and convicted
		• List of steps taken to bring the justice system and citizens closer. • Number of pro bono cases liquidated
		• Existence of a training programme for people who conduct traditional justice. • Number of visits from officials from the formal justice system to traditional justice institutions.

PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 3: Justice	Capacity of justice institutions	• Total budget allocation to justice sector as of total state budget • % of overall budget allocated to justice sector and expenditures • % of national budget allocated to the justice sector • Budget allocated to the judiciary in the last 5 years and effectively released.
		• Existence of laws such as: * Law on sexual violence, law on child protection • Existence of a structure responsible for the accessibility of specific laws. (target) / Number of laws made accessible. • The inclusion of traditional justice norms into legal code (target) • # of customary legal issues/cases that complement or are consistent with the statutory system and the percentage of cases resolved by traditional/ customary justice systems
		• Existence of a plan and a programme for reform. Budget of the reform. • Availability of an annual report of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary. • Existence of planning and programming of recruitment and retirement. • Improvements in status and salary scales of judges. (target)
		• Distribution of judicial structures per province, district and territory. (target) • Distribution of magistrate/high court at the district and regions • Proportion of Public Defender to the total population by district • Ratio of lawyers to 100,000 prisoners • Number of judges per 100,000 population • Ratio of Prisoners to prison wards by region • Ratio of prisoners to cell space
		• # of fully trained and assigned justice staff (judges and magistrate, prosecutors, public defenders, correctional officers and lawyers and staff) • Number of women recruited in the judiciary. • Number of judges recruited per year. • Number of judges and other court staff retiring per year. • Number of judges and other judicial personnel trained per year • Number of moral talks given by the head of the judiciary institution in front of judicial personnel and judges.
		• Number of judicial infrastructure built and rehabilitated in the last 5 years. / Number of fully equipped courts. • Number of military courts set up and working. • Number of peace courts built. • Number of local courts set up to hear rape cases.
		• Availability of separate detention facility for women and children • Existence of specific outfits, beds and bed clothes for prison inmates. • Food rations served to prison inmates are sufficient, varied and balanced. • Existence of internal courtyards/libraries/visitor's rooms/ training workshops for prison

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PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 3: Justice	Performance of justice institutions	• Perception of overall performance of the justice system • % of public who perceive the justice system (judiciary) to be independent
		• Report by the Supreme Council of the Judiciary reasserting the independence of justice. • Number of legal claims from individual or organization against state on violation international norms to the court • # / % of justice personnel prosecuted and convicted for corruption • List of elite offenders punished. • Number of arbitrary arrest made • Number of person in illegal detention by district
		• Proportion of cases resolved from total cases reported on annually • # of Corruption case received & prosecuted • No of land dispute cases prosecuted • Number of victims that have been compensated. • Number of court decisions enforced. • Number and coverage of consultation of public interest legislation • Number of cases of sexual violence prosecuted. • Length of sentences of sexual offenders • Existence of juvenile courts throughout the country. • Number of judges posted to juvenile courts.
		• Measures have been implemented to help the poor have access to formal justice. (target) • % Population with awareness of legal and human rights

PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 4: Economic Foundations	Economic conditions	• GDP and GDP Growth rate • Growth of Export • Price Inflation CPI • Current Account balance as % of GDP • Budget deficit rate, exchange rate, • Deficit of the balance of payments, debt sustainability rate, • Number of foreign direct investments, • Level of national reserve in weeks of imports, • Human Development Index
		• GINI index • Income inequality among regions / Level of poverty in the various provinces / Income gap between urban and rural areas, and between the capital and the provinces.
		• The income earners that get less that 2/3 of the median income / % of the total income appropriated by the lowest 40% of the population • School enrolment rates according to social class, in urban and rural areas, and in capital and the other provinces.
		• Number of government projects and program that being implemented in district level • Fund release rate compared to budget allocations, • Level of enforcement of VAT.
		• Number of km of primary and feeder roads constructed • % of connecting roads that are paved roads by district • % of population with access to roads and electricity • % of population with access to electricity • Coverage rate of electricity supply, • Coverage rate of drinking water supply. • Coverage rate of paved and built roads • Cost per kw hr (at household, SME level)
		• Level of economic diversification by productive sector • Level of added value in mining resources, • Quantity of staple food (rice, maize) produced per hectare • Size of the informal economy against GDP, size of the informal and illicit economy compared with the formal economy, • Number of workers in the informal sector.

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PSG Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 4: Economic Foundations — Jobs, livelihoods, and private sector development	• Doing business data (WB) / time required to set up a company
	• Level of employment (by youth, gender, region) • % of vulnerable employment in total employment/ number of young people and women recruited / number of poor children recruited / number of women and people with disabilities recruited.
	• Number of companies created, • Number of newly registered businesses and SMEs • MSME (micro, small and medium) share of GDP% • No of new jobs created per annum by public sector • Number of new jobs created by the private sector. • Importance of the private sector in job creation (target) / Number of national population who work for private sectors
	• Number of workers made redundant, • Number of collective disputes at work, • Number of industrial tribunals, • Ratio of trials won by workers to number of court actions brought during the year.
	• % of People with Bank Account • % of population below the poverty line / purchasing power of workers and of the population, • No of persons with access to mobile phones • Share of food in household expenditure • Maternal mortality rates • Number of poor children and girls enrolled in schools,
	• Number of Companies paying tax by national and district level • Share of revenue going to the people, • Ratio of foreign workers to nationals / percentage of foreigners working in the private sector, percentage of nationals in the private sector. • Ratio of local versus international staff in technical capacity in the oil and gas industry (target) • Number of employment in the mining area
	• Existence of clear and publicly available land policy • Number of farmland disputes among smallholders / number of land dispute cases reported by individual and community group
	• % of arable land under productive agriculture • Annual agricultural production and % of change of main food crop • Kilometers of Paved Roads

PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 4: Economic Foundations	Exploitation of natural resources	• Existence of regulatory framework for nat. resource management • National forestry reform law implementation
		• Ratio of natural resource revenue to total government revenue • Percentage of revenue allocated to local populations. • Perception of participation in and benefits from natural resources • Number of indigenous people left out of the distribution of natural resources; • Ratio of local/foreign employment in the natural resource sector • Number of plots or/and operations distributed to foreigners; number of plots or/and operations distributed to nationals. • # of conflicts / incidents and legal procedures associated with land ownership • Number of conflicts caused by poor distribution of natural resources.
		• Level of respect of international agreements. • Kimberly process requirements • Number of companies created in compliance with standards
		• Number of illegal operators arrested. • Percentage of goods illegally exported. • Number of traffickers arrested. • Number of actions brought against traffickers or other illegal groups. • Number of politicians or military officials arrested in connection with the illegal trade in natural resources. • Number of illegal operations closed. • Number of security services in charge of monitoring all sites. • Number of safe mining sites

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PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 5: Revenue and services	Revenue generation	• State control/monopoly over tax, customs and fee collection (target) • Existence of a coherent fiscal policy paper. • Existence of an institutional framework that clearly sets out the mandates of the government organisations. (target) • Existence of instruments for the implementation of the various relevant laws (target) • Revision of Tax Law to reflect the inclusion of other domestic activities as the revenue source • Number of laws enacted.
		• Public perception of fairness of tax administration
		• Growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP). • Growth rate of internal and external investment. • Public Debt as % of GDP
		• Tax effort • Proportion of domestic revenue as a total of state revenue • Revenue collected as % of GDP • % of growth rate of annual revenue / rate of increase of fiscal and non fiscal revenues. • Fiscal deficit as % of GDP
		• # of economic activities captured by the tax collection framework • Number of local tax collectors • # of tax collection officers trained with adequate logistics/equipment deployed through out the country • # of incidents of fraud and abuse cases reported and sanctioned

PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 5: Revenue and services	Public administration	• % increase in government expenditure as a share of GDP • % of spending in priority sectors • Proportion of aid entered in the budget.
		• Corruption perception index • # of corruption cases reported, investigated and successfully prosecuted • Number of public officials sanctioned for corruption and bribery.
		• Perception of service delivery effectiveness • % Satisfactory with the quality of public service
		• Quality of public financial management and internal oversight • # of timely, periodic internal audit reports and # of agencies with internal auditors • Number of contractors who deliver bad quality of projects blacklisted by the government • Number of civil servant who receive administrative sanction because lack of accountability, transparency and integrity • Number of people recruited based on objective criteria / number of civil servant who periodically promoted based on their performance evaluation report • Budget execution rate in ministries at central and subnational level • Number of civil servants trained / rate of growth of qualified civil servants

PSG	Dimension	Indicators from all five pilot countries
PSG 5: Revenue and services	Service delivery	• Social spending as share of total spending / Share of budget allocated to the provision of priority services. • Proportion of the state budget allocated to sovereignty expenditures. (?) • Ratio between ODA and government's budget allocation on social sectors (health, education and clean water) • Proportion of budget allocation on capital development as a total of allocation to sectoral Ministries (health, education and clean water) • Expenditure per capita in each social sector. • Existence of documents on sectoral policies and strategies. • Existence of service delivery quality standards in gov't agencies • Existence of a communication policy for basic services et their costs. • Proportion of citizens who have access to the information. • Public satisfaction with service delivery • % of public satisfaction to basic social services • # of reports of citizens who paid bribes to obtain services • # of households satisfied with the quality of government services • Evidence of inequalities in the provision of services between identity groups / geographical areas / gender • Proportion of population with access to health and education facilities • Proportion of population with access to safe drinking water and sanitation • Number of operational health zones. • Number of operational schools per educational province. • Health personnel per 10,000 people and teachers per 100 students • Ratio of health personnel (nurse and midwife) to the total population at national and subnational level • Ratio of teachers to the total students in a class at district level • Proportion of qualified personnel in priority service provision. • Number of experts in the field of priority services. • Number of training and professional development centres / number of trained and retrained staff assigned to priority services.

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