

# The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

**Contribution by the Government of Liberia**

**March 2010**



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# Preface

## The International Dialogue

This country-level consultation is part of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. This intergovernmental dialogue initiative was established as an outcome of the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in September 2008. It is chaired by a partner and donor country jointly (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the UK), and will hold its first formal global meeting on 9-10 April 2010 in Dili, Timor-Leste.

The purpose of the International Dialogue is to examine good practices and key bottlenecks in international support for peacebuilding and statebuilding and to generate consensus around fundamental priorities and objectives in these areas. The International Dialogue will involve multiple international and national stakeholders and provide a forum to discuss issues that are under-addressed, or cannot be resolved at the country-level.

The initiative thereby aims to contribute to build trust between participating countries and organisations. Furthermore, it will encourage the sharing of experiences on South-South cooperation in the area of peacebuilding and statebuilding and will enable participating countries to focus their attention on issues that are of common concern in view of the need to instil behavioural or normative change.

This report outlines the main findings and recommendations of the consultative process on peacebuilding and statebuilding in Liberia. They will be shared with the International Dialogue steering group and inform discussions at the global meeting.

# List of abbreviations

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DM&E	(Project) design, monitoring and implementation
GoL	Government of Liberia
LRDC	Liberia Reconstruction & Development Committee
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PBO	(Liberia) Peacebuilding Office
Poverty Reduction Strategy	Poverty Reduction Strategy
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Fund
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia

# 1 Executive summary

## 1.1 Summary of key findings

### Peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities

Liberia's peacebuilding priorities focus on the underlying drivers of conflict, including land-related issues, poor governance and dysfunctional judicial systems. Its statebuilding priorities focus on advancing the legitimacy and capabilities of state institutions to deliver core functions, including maintenance of territorial and human security, establishment and maintenance of rule of law, and delivery of basic social services.

### Key bottlenecks and challenges for governments and external actors to achieve or support peacebuilding and statebuilding processes

Four thematic challenges were sub-divided into two predominant issues of concern:

- Policy development: post-Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) planning and complex aid conditionality;
- Implementation challenges: unpredictable international support and inconsistent monitoring and evaluation;
- Capacity constraints: inadequate conflict sensitivity analysis, institutional and human resources constraints; and
- Institutional frameworks: weak inter-government collaboration and corruption.

### Strategic planning modalities for peacebuilding and statebuilding

The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) provides the overarching framework for peacebuilding and statebuilding for the period 2008-2011. International partner frameworks such as the United Nations Development Assistance Fund (UNDAF) generally align with the PRS. The Liberia Reconstruction & Development Committee (LRDC), chaired by the president, is the main coordination structure through which government and partners engage in policy dialogue and gauge aid effectiveness.

### Success stories and good practice

There are many success stories and good practices that can be gleaned from the PRS development and implementation processes. First, the broad based consultative process of designing the PRS was a good practice that needs to be emulated in subsequent national developing planning as it ensures stakeholders' buy-in and ownership, both of which are critical to successful implementation of any kind of public policies or programmes.

Other key successes of peacebuilding and statebuilding Liberia include:

- The LRDC framework to monitor implementation and coordinate donor assistances;
- Monitoring and evaluation framework of the PRS and Country Development Agendas;
- Efforts to restructure sector institutions (army and policy);

- Building of critical infrastructure (roads, clinics, and schools) and delivery of basic social services, and
- Strengthening the administration of the governance and the rule of law.

## **1.2 Key recommendations for the International Dialogue**

Recommendations for international consideration include:

- Support to the development of a locally owned, long-term national development plan (national vision);
- Support to long term capacity development of Liberian institutions and individuals;
- Adaptation of aid conditionality to suit the local Liberian context;
- More proactive move toward the use of Liberian systems including direct budget support by international partners;
- Enhance alignment of development assistance to Liberia's development priorities as identified by Liberians; and
- Provide longer term and more predictable aid portfolios.

## 2 Country context

Liberia's 14-year civil war ended with the signing of the 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Established in 1847, the Republic of Liberia was founded on the principles of freedom, liberty and equality for all. Throughout the course of Liberia's 163-year history, these principles and ideals were lost. Over time this led to the unravelling of the Liberian state and its eventual collapse into civil war. Throughout the conflict, an estimated 200,000 Liberians lost their lives and nearly one million Liberians were displaced by fighting – fleeing internally, to neighbouring countries and abroad (PRS, 2008, p.14). The entire governance and economic infrastructure were almost completely destroyed. The prevailing uncertainty and insecurity were aggravated by a breakdown of the social fabric, with armed factions committing widespread violations of human rights. Liberia, to all intents and purposes, had become a failed state.

The path to recovery in Liberia remains long and arduous. The Accra CPA provided the framework for a robust attempt by the international community to provide humanitarian assistance and work with the elected government to map out a direction for recovery and national development. The momentum from donor support and Liberians own desire for peace led to a transformation of Liberia's approach and vision for the future. In the post-conflict context, Liberia's strategic framework was created around the Millennium Development Goals and focused on addressing the root causes of the conflict.

In 2008, in collaboration with external support, the Government of Liberia (GoL) through extensive consultation with the Liberian people initiated the country's first strategic planning framework, the national PRS, *Lift Liberia*. From 2004 to 2007, an estimated \$1.2 billion dollars of donor assistance poured into Liberia to support the implementation of this framework.

There is a concerted effort underway internally and externally to propel Liberia forward, but important challenges remain. Liberia is still fragile, with weak social cohesion, high poverty and unemployment levels and inconsistent citizen participation and ownership of the development agenda. It is against this backdrop that peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts are concentrated and that the road is marked. The way forward is hopeful.

### **Legacies and challenges**

The legacy of war remains apparent. In the eyes of many ordinary citizens, the deep-rooted structural, social and economic divisions that fed the conflict not only persist, but are also compounded by 14 years of inter-communal violence and social dislocation. The practical consequences of the conflict have been severe. Commercial and productive activities ceased as warlords looted the country. Families, and entire communities, were uprooted, and the social, political, economic and traditional governance systems were destroyed. The economy completely collapsed, and GDP fell a catastrophic 90 percent between 1987 and 1995, one of the largest economic collapses ever recorded in the world. By the time of the 005 elections, average income in Liberia was just one-quarter of what it had been in 1987, and just one-sixth of its level in 1979. The education system all but collapsed. Combined with the mass exodus of skilled and talented individuals from the country, it created a capacity deficit that severely impacts the country's ability to address the challenges of recovery.

## Emergent recovery

Liberia began to stabilise and recover following the 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement. United Nations peacekeepers and others in the international community contributed significantly to consolidating the peace, assisting with the successful 2005 elections, and supporting Liberia's recovery efforts. The new government introduced a robust set of policy reforms to spur reconstruction and development, and the economy is on the rebound. Economic growth reached an estimated 5.3 percent in 2005, an estimated 7.8 percent in 2006, and further accelerated to an estimated 9.5 percent in 2007.

Today, many storefronts are newly painted, shelves are restocked, and business is expanding. Families are repairing their homes. Hotels and restaurants are re-opening. Trucks are lining up at building supply stores and small construction projects are evident throughout the country. Road construction is underway, and schools and clinics have reopened. Road and port traffic has increased markedly. Agricultural production is recovering, and foreign investment is rising. Most importantly, hope has been restored.

While many challenges lie ahead, Liberians are optimistic about the future for the first time in decades. This hope and optimism was exhibited by the enthusiasm of citizens during the PRS consultative process, some of whom walked for more than 15 hours to attend district and county-level meetings.

# 3 Findings

## 3.1 Key peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities and objectives

Addressing the fragility of a state after 14 years of civil conflict, 35 years of economic decline, and the complete collapse of its institutions of governance, requires careful navigation and difficult prioritisation choices. Liberia's primary focus has been on establishing peace and security, whilst also working to advance the delivery of social services and promotion of economic growth.

The peacebuilding priorities specified in the PRS focus on addressing the underlying drivers of conflict, including:

- *Land conflicts:* Land disputes have become a manifestation of conflict over identity and citizenship issues. There is a proliferation of land disputes over tenure and ownership, the reintegration of refugees and ex-combatants into communities in relation to property, the property rights of women, and private concessions.
- *Youth:* Young men and women have been denied education and had their transition from childhood to adulthood interrupted by war. Few have skills and many are burdened with the responsibilities of adults, particularly as heads of households and income earners. Unmet expectations with this group could trigger significant social unrest, not only in Liberia, but across the region.
- *Political polarisation:* Reaching political consensus on the rules of the game, supporting reconciliation rather than polarisation, and de-linking political and economic power are essential for ensuring that the political system is a vehicle for peaceful political competition. In its absence, political actors are likely to resort to other means to achieve their ends, including intimidation and violence.
- *Management of natural resources:* Liberia's wealth of natural resources has not benefited society as a whole but has served to create inequalities and resentment. GoL has taken a number of important steps to redress this including the Forestry Reform Law and the Chain of Custody Act. It is important for the PRS to recognise the importance of balancing the needs of the poor with the needs for national development and revenue generation.
- *State and citizen relations:* The Liberian state historically has been more predatory in nature than protective of its citizens. It created and exacerbated social divisions by marginalising and denigrating certain social groups, and consolidating the domination of elites. Political and economic power is linked, exacerbating urban-rural inequality.
- *Weak and dysfunctional justice systems:* The formal and customary justice systems do not provide justice and have created a system of impunity.

Initiatives to address these issues revolve mainly around the establishment of the Liberia Peacebuilding Office (PBO). Supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the PBO directly supports the peacebuilding priorities outlined in the PRS and aims to strengthen the capacities of government and local and international peacebuilding organisations to deliver conflict sensitive policies and programmes. It also seeks to strengthen coordination and coherence amongst the various peacebuilding actors and institutions in Liberia, and it supports peacebuilding projects covering a broad spectrum of activities, including:

- Peace and human rights education in schools;
- Civic education;
- Youth empowerment;
- Local and national reconciliation;
- Reintegration of high-risk youths, and
- Enhancing police / civilian population relations.

Its statebuilding priorities focus on advancing the legitimacy and capabilities of state institutions to deliver core functions of the state, including:

- Maintenance of territorial and human security;
- Establishment and maintenance of rule of law;
- Fair collection of revenue to finance state functions;
- Development and management of conditions for economic growth; and
- Delivery of basic social services.

And its statebuilding initiatives include:

- Reforming and strengthening the security apparatus of the state;
- Building sustainable capacity, with emphasis on human capital development and institution building;
- Promoting economic growth and private sector development to expand job opportunities for Liberians; and
- Introducing institutions and processes to drive reforms essential for addressing obstacles to Liberia's statebuilding process, including land disputes (prompting the creation of the Land Commission), corruption and mismanagement of funds, prompting the creation of the Governance Commission, the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission, Public Procurement Concessions Commission, the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and the Governance and Economic Management Programme.

Forthcoming challenges for Liberia include the general elections scheduled for 2011, and the downsizing of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), possibly as early as 2012 (if the election process is peaceful). More specific current challenges revolve around the controversial recommendations of Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which address a broad range of highly sensitive issues, with potentially far-reaching (and, arguably, destabilising) consequences.

The youthfulness of the Liberian population presents both an opportunity but potentially another risk factor. If the unskilled youth remain unemployed and do not see a spread of the peace dividends quickly, they could be exploited by war profiteers and spoilers of peace.

## **3.2 Strategic planning modalities for peacebuilding and statebuilding**

### **Strategic planning frameworks: the Liberia PRS**

Since the end of the conflict Liberia has had a number of reconstruction plans to address the immediate needs of the nation, including the 150 Day Deliverables and the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, each of which informed the development of the current PRS, which was formulated in early 2008 and launched in June of the same year.

The PRS<sup>1</sup> is the main national strategic planning framework. It articulates the government’s overall vision and major strategies for moving toward rapid, inclusive and sustainable growth and development during the period 2008-2011. As such, it provides the overarching framework for post-crisis peacebuilding and statebuilding.


The PRS is organised around four pillars:

- Expanding peace and security;
- Revitalising the economy;
- Strengthening governance and the rule of law; and
- Rehabilitating infrastructure and delivering basic services.

**Planning and coordination structures**

The Liberia Reconstruction & Development Committee, chaired by the president, is the main coordination structure through which GoL and international partners engage policy dialogue and measure aid effectiveness.

The PRS process adopted an inclusive governance structure, consisting of seven main hierarchical but interactive components (see figure 1 below). The cabinet sits at the apex of the structure and is responsible for the final endorsement and ongoing ownership of the PRS on the part of the government.



**Figure 1: The PRS coordination structure**

Immediately below the cabinet sits the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee, which is the main government-partner forum coordinating the national reconstruction agenda (figure 2, below). A steering committee chaired by the president and including key ministers and international partners, makes policy decisions in relation to the national reconstruction and development agenda, and ensures coordination across key ministries and between the government and its partners.

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<sup>1</sup> The Government of Liberia, Poverty Reduction Strategy, April 2008.



**Figure 2: Liberia Reconstruction & Development Committee (LRDC)**

As complementary development planning frameworks, the national strategies articulated by Liberia’s international development partners align with the PRS and define how the partner institution can complement the government’s goals and objectives. For each partner institution, internal alignment and harmonisation is the next challenge once alignment with the national development plan is achieved.

In the case of the UN, the agencies operates within a common framework called the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which serves to coordinate the work of the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMIL and the activities of the 16 specialised UN agencies and funds present in Liberia. The future withdrawal of UNMIL will affect the overall strategic plan of the UN family, and integrated transition planning will need to be amplified to maintain coherent support to GoL and people of Liberia.

### **Insufficient consensus on effective monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes**

From a government perspective, effective progress on implementing the PRS is undermined by a lack of consensus on what constitutes ‘successful implementation’ of policies and projects. Government and donors have different approaches to project design, monitoring and implementation (DM&E). Whilst degrees of difference are inevitable, the lack of an overarching and coherent approach to DM&E undermines not only the prospects for conflict-sensitive policy and programme design, but also for the elaboration of a shared vision of national development to which all key stakeholders subscribe. Without this shared vision, the foundations of Liberia’s peacebuilding and statebuilding agendas are undermined.

Partners tend to concur that most DM&E, as reflected both in the PRS and in partners’ programmes, is less about impact and more about measurement. The need for an overarching vision of national development is critical here, as it provides a narrative to which all stakeholders should subscribe. Whilst chapter 2 of the PRS provides the narrative, to which all partners subscribe, there is no shared vision of how to measure the delivery of objectives, thereby undermining the collective capacity to assess progress.

A good example is the Ministry of Health. It has a Health Action Plan, which presents a vision for health delivery and takes into account delivery of healthcare by institutions from all sectors. This, coupled with strong financial controls, has enabled partners to buy-in to the ministry’s vision, and to contribute to a pool fund to support its delivery. These tools have encouraged the necessary collaboration between GoL and donors to develop a shared determination of successful implementation.

The discussions during the consultation led to a number of guiding questions for the International Dialogue and informed the developed of the recommendations from Liberia’s peacebuilding and statebuilding experience:

## Guiding questions

- The Ministry of Health's Health Action Plan is regarded as a good example of a shared GoL / donor vision that facilitates effective M&E. What are the lessons to be learned from this example, and what might the potential pitfalls be?
- What is the best way to determine the successful implementation of a policy, programme or project (i.e., by output, outcome or impact)?
- What is the best way to generate consensus between stakeholders on effective M&E criteria?
- What might the next steps be to advance this process?

### 3.3 Key challenges for governments and external actors to achieve or support peacebuilding and statebuilding process

Consultation with government representatives, international partners and civil society organisations identified a broad range of challenges to more effective international support to national peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities.

The challenges were consolidated into four thematic groups, and within each group primary issues were identified for further discussion during the national dialogue meeting.

#### Theme 1: Policy development

- Post- PRS planning
- Complex aid conditionality

#### Theme 2: Implementation challenges

- Unpredictable levels of international support

#### Theme 3: Capacity constraints

- Insufficient capacity to mainstream conflict sensitivity in policy and programme design
- General capacity constraints

#### Theme 4: Institutional constraints

- Weak institutional arrangements between government agencies
- Corruption

Sets of guiding questions were devised to frame discussion and facilitate recommendations for each of the themes and issues.

#### Theme 1: Policy development

##### *Post-PRS planning*

The PRS policy timeframe expires in 2011. Consolidating and building-on current peacebuilding and statebuilding gains will require an unprecedented degree of collaboration between government, citizens and international partners. This presents many challenges, including the following:

## Guiding questions

- What key lessons (positive and negative) have we learned from the process?
- How should the next national development plan be formulated?
- How can we ensure that the next development plan reflects the aspirations of all Liberians?
- Should peacebuilding remain a cross-cutting issue, or become a specific pillar?

### Complex aid conditionality

Government and civil society suggest that complex aid conditionality hampers peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. International partners disburse support slowly due, in part, to conditionality constraints. There is also a perception that conditionality often prevents bilateral partners from accurately aligning support with national peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities.

The Accra Agenda for Action highlights the need for donor partners to adjust regulations to suit the recipient country<sup>2</sup> thereby tailoring aid to suit specific local conditions (an observation derived from the recognition that skewed or uneven distribution of aid hampers the development and implementation of effective peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda).

In similar vein, James Boyce observes that “The opportunities to use conditionality to support peacebuilding are constrained (by) conflicting interests on both the recipient and donor sides of the foreign-aid coin.”<sup>3</sup> It is essential, therefore, to use conditionality in ways that support, rather than constrain, peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts.

International partners acknowledge the issues, but stress that aid is not ‘free money’ for either disburser or recipient to do with as they please – there are requirements at each end of the local equation. Thus, whilst noting that both national and multilateral partners are accountable to those who provide the funds and to the political priorities of their governments. There is a general acceptance that, in principle, measures such as streamlining of regulations, streamlining of financial years, and agreement of multi-year funding would help address the issues.

## Guiding questions

- How might multilateral partners (e.g. IMF and the World Bank) adjust conditionality to reflect the institutional and operational realities of post-conflict Liberia?
- How might international partners improve the situation (by, for example, streamlining regulations and financial years, approving multi-year funding etc.)?
- How might bilateral partners adjust aid conditionalities to better align with national peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities?
- What might the next steps be in pushing this agenda?

## Theme 2: Implementation

### *Unpredictable levels of international support*

The government perspective is that, since the onset of the global financial crisis, Liberia has seen a significant reduction in aid. This has had an impact on the effectiveness of the PRS, and may continue to hinder Liberia’s pursuit of its peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. Consolidating the peace requires international partners to provide dependable levels of support (consistent with commitments made at the Berlin Conference in 2008) to enable Liberia to plan effective delivery of the PRS objectives.

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<sup>2</sup> Accra Aid for Action.

<sup>3</sup> J. Boyce, “Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Constraints”, *Development and Change*, Vol.33 No. 5, 2002, p.1025-1048.

Should the ability of the government and its partners falter in this regard, the peace will remain precarious.

A salient issue is the often lengthy gap between the announcement of funding and the availability of that funding (often extending to a year or more). Partners accept that this delay creates uncertainties and raises expectations. More pertinently, cycles of assistance are often mismatched to the needs of country, and its ability to absorb them due to weak institutions and lack of expertise to manage aid (including the capacity to develop and implement strategy). This challenge has remained unaddressed due to international partners' lack of early focus on developing managerial capacity and effective operating systems.

Partners feel that aligning aid in support of national peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities is less important than their ability to commit to long-term initiatives, as funding is often allocated in short term cycles. Consequently, bilateral donors cannot commit to funding for specific programmes for longer than three to five years, and multilateral partners have themselves to raise funds from their member states. There is a need for more transition planning in terms of transferring responsibility from partners to government. Reduction in funding levels during recovery period is troublesome and needs to be addressed.

### Guiding questions

- **Liberia's efforts to transition from relief to rehabilitation and development coincide with an unprecedented global financial crisis. Is it likely that donor support for Liberia's post-conflict transformation will decline over the next several years?**
- **If so, what might the national (and, by extension, sub-regional) consequences be?**
- **How might Liberia best offset any projected decline in international support?**
- **Regardless of whether aid levels rise, fall or remain constant, how might the Government of Liberia and its international partners better engage long-term planning of aid-supported initiatives?**
- **What might the next steps be to progress this agenda?**

### Theme 3: Capacity challenges

#### *Insufficient capacity to mainstream conflict sensitivity in policy and programme initiatives*

There is general agreement that a key requirement for peacebuilding and statebuilding is the mainstreaming of conflict-sensitivity in the design of policies and programmes. This approach ensures that their implementation does not exacerbate existing tensions, and actively addresses the underlying drivers of conflict. Whilst there is broad commitment to conflict sensitivity, it often amounts to little more than lip service and little tangible progress towards mainstreaming even the basic principles.

International partners note that, during the emergency recovery phase the GoL and international partners focused on providing the basics, such as rebuilding physical infrastructure, and re-establishing core institutions of state. These priorities set the framework of the PRS, meaning that the document is couched largely in technical, almost value neutral, terms, which has set the agenda for international partners to focus on improving physical, economic and organisational ('hardware') issues, without adequately addressing the less tangible 'software' (i.e. capacity building) aspects of the process, which clearly include the capacity to design and implement policies and programmes in a conflict-sensitive manner.

Where the social and institutional fabric of a country have been torn apart by conflict (and may, indeed, have been primary drivers of) conflict, rebuilding them in a manner that addresses historical inequities requires capacities beyond the purely technical. That the emphasis on conflict-sensitivity is emerging a bit late in Liberia is an important issue for discussion in itself, but for the moment the key questions revolve around how to ensure that it becomes a core consideration in policy and project design for both the GoL and the international partners.

## Guiding questions

- How might conflict sensitivity be mainstreamed across the policy and programme procedures of both GoL and international partners without exacerbating existing tensions?
- What key departments / agencies should be involved?
- What should the next steps be?

### *General capacity constraints*

The capacity deficit remains a significant area of concern. A major impact of the conflict was a dramatic decrease in human capacity. The educational system was left in ruins, and Liberians with a wide variety of managerial, administrative, technical and academic skills fled the country. As the country moves forward, the effects of the capacity deficit are felt across the spectrum, from government, to workplace, to classroom.

Government provides a critical example of this capacity deficit, which is undermining the implementation of critical policies and projects necessary for the consolidation of peace and stability. For example, ministries may have sufficient technical capacities to comprehend their portfolios, but may lack the strategic and managerial capacities to develop and implement a sector plan. Whilst some progress is being made through increased emphasis on education and programmes tailored to attract the diaspora to return home, GoL believes that this needs to be complemented by a greater emphasis on strengthening the labour force capacities required to support the economic development that will underpin the peacebuilding and statebuilding processes.

Partners concur that there is an unsatisfactory tendency to address capacity issues by repeated training and workshops, because these are easier to provide rather than the steady building of institutional capacity. In this vein, partners welcome the establishment of the government's National Capacity Development Unit (see below).

Partners also recognise that long-term technical assistance and mentoring programmes are required, but bilateral donors in particular often find it hard to release technical expertise from their own countries for long enough periods. In addition, many officials working for donors are on short-term contract because organisations find it hard to attract qualified professionals to countries such as Liberia for long periods. Continuity of approach and organisational memory are often lost, as new advisers take time to build up local knowledge, to understand the political context and to adjust to the institutions with which they are working.

## Guiding questions

- What are the shortcomings of the current approach to capacity development?
- What is the best strategy to develop Liberia's human capacity in the short to medium term?
- Who should be the priority target groups, and why?
- What would the most appropriate types of support entail, and how might they be delivered?
- What might be the next steps to progress this agenda?

## Theme 4: Institutional constraints

### *Weak institutional arrangements between government agencies*

A major impediment to effective peacebuilding and statebuilding is the weak institutional arrangements between government agencies. Poor inter-agency coordination has delayed implementation of critical projects, and curtailed delivery of the PRS objectives. Whilst this issue was highlighted in the LRDC's First Year Report on the implementation of the PRS, little has been done to deal with it. If left unaddressed, it constrains the effective implementation of current policy, and undermines the foundations of the long-term statebuilding process. Strengthening institutional arrangements between government agencies will undoubtedly enhance peacebuilding and statebuilding procedures.

Partners agree that inter-agency coordination is a challenge and note that this deficit makes it difficult to work on cross-cutting policies. On their part, international partners acknowledge that whilst they have tried to align their support with the PRS, they have been less effective in aligning with each other. The UN has revised its UNDAF to “deliver as one” to ensure that, internally, it addresses the problem. Other partners have country strategy papers, but in some cases acknowledge that these can have parallel rather than converging strategies.

Pool funds and multi-donor mechanisms have proven the most effective donor co-ordination mechanism, but the rules of some individual partners do not allow them to contribute to joint funding arrangements. Also priorities, rules and procedures and M&E of the various partners differ making working together and flexibility to respond to emerging and changing needs difficult. There is a general acceptance that this compounds the problem of poor inter-government agency coordination.

### **Guiding questions**

- **What do we mean by weak institutional arrangements between government agencies?**
- **What are the main contributory factors?**
- **How can coordination be improved to enhance service delivery?**
- **What support might be required to improve coordination?**
- **What might the next steps be to progress this agenda?**

### **Corruption**

As noted in the PRS, corruption remains a common across government and various facets of Liberian society. A driver of conflict itself, it persists as a cross-cutting issue that underscores each of the bottlenecks described in this paper. It weakens state institutions and hinders the implementation of policies and projects intended to rebuild the country.

A roadmap towards strong, non-corrupt state institutions is essential for securing a solid foundation for the statebuilding process. The Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission, despite its own internal challenges, serves as an example of government efforts to combat corruption and to address a root cause of conflict.

There is a direct correlation between aid effectiveness and corruption. The responsibility for enhanced aid effectiveness is the responsibility of external actors but most importantly GoL. However, the prevalence of corruption undermines the legitimacy of the state and the government, and encourages donors to increase aid restrictions, which reinforces problems highlighted in previous sections of this paper, and further delaying implementation of projects. By continuing to aggressively tackle the issue of corruption, current aid distribution and implementation can be more effective.

Partners feel that piecemeal approaches to dealing with endemic corruption have not engendered confidence. The lack of an agreed national integrity system which includes legislative and regulatory frameworks, uniform policies for economic governance, accounting standards and financial management systems across government, inadequate investigative and prosecutorial systems and expertise and little public accountability perpetuate the uncertainty and compound the problem.

### **Guiding questions**

- **What additional steps can the GoL and international partners take to ensure corruption doesn't undermine economic growth and development?**
- **What are the key institutions and stakeholder groups, and what might their respective roles be?**
- **What might be the next steps in advancing this agenda?**

In conclusion, the key bottlenecks raised in this section shed light on challenges faced by GoL and its international partners. The path ahead is filled with many hurdles, but the finish line remains in reach.

The recommendations presented in section 4 of this report are intended to help Liberia and its international partners navigate the path ahead.

### **3.4 Good practices and success stories in peacebuilding and statebuilding**

It is important not to lose sight of the success stories. Liberia's good practices in peacebuilding and statebuilding include the establishing the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee that has yielded positive results in addressing a broad spectrum of issues through open consultation and focused working groups directly aligned to the pillars of the PRS and the National Development Plan.

The Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee has provided a forum for institutional response to many of the bottlenecks identified in this report. The PRS structure has been instrumental in supporting the following good practices in each pillar:

#### **Security sector reform**

Through the dedication of the Liberian government and support of partners, progress is underway in the security sector. The National Security Sector Reform of Liberia continues to serve as a backbone for reform. GoL, in concert with its partners, have been able to completely restructure the security sector of the country, build a new professional national army, and complete the Standard Operating Procedures for all security agencies. These agencies have completed their curriculum and training modules to recruit and train new officers and deploy them around the country. This whole process has been key to laying the first building blocks for re-establishing the confidence of the international community in GoL's commitment to lead reforms. Addressing residual issues of corruption within the service and lack of adequate competence represent the critical next steps.

Looking forward in the security sector, the eventual withdrawal of the UNMIL, the peacekeeping force, represents a major challenge to peacebuilding and statebuilding. As UNMIL draws down, the state security apparatus must take up the essential security functions of a capable state. To prepare for this challenge, GoL has recently proposed a joint-planning process with UNMIL and the rest of the UN family to prepare for the withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission. While this is one of the major tests for Liberia's peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda, it bodes well that the government is proactively addressing this critical change process with leadership and active engagement with partners.

#### **Economic revitalisation**

Pertinent to national recovery has been economic revitalisation and the insurance of fiscal responsibility of government resources. The protection of natural resources has been a high agenda point for the government. Regardless of the corruption and misuse of state resources, GoL has been able to put into place measures to increase internal revenues collection to as much as 300 per cent while being able to put in place measures that have been able to curb corruption. The primary objective of the ongoing financial sector reform in Liberia is to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public financial management processes, with the objective of enhancing the quality of public service delivery in government, and to provide timely, transparent and accurate financial and accounting information across the government.

A new public financial management law that provides the basis for improved public financial management, and addresses weaknesses in budget preparation, has been passed by the legislature and is being implemented. This assists with budget execution, cash planning, inter-government banking arrangement, enhanced reporting and accountability procedures, debt and guarantee management, and internal audit processes.

The government, through the Ministry of Planning, is accelerating its dialogue with the private sector in recognition that hindrances in its relationship with businesses still exist, and grievances related to tax law, land ownership, and business owners' rights are acute. As such, the government is in dialogue with the consortium of private sector businesses to establish a Liberian Development Alliance to broker public-private partnerships for reform and development, which is still in the concept-formulation stage.

## **Good governance and rule of law**

All parties agree there needs to be good governance and respect for the rule of law. Recognising this, the GoL made strengthening good governance and the rule of law one of the pillars of the PRS (I). Significant advances have been made in many areas of the judiciary, press freedom, freedom of speech and association as well as central and regional governance.

The government has set as one of its deliverables under the PRS (I) the development and implementation of a national enabling framework for the provision of legal aid, particularly for the poorest and most vulnerable members of society. Bolstering the public defender system, the provision of legal aid in civil cases, and enhancing the role of civil society in supporting access to justice have achieved this. Each county in Liberia now has a public defender, their offices have been built or renovated and they have all been provided with transportation.

Looking forward in the governance and rule of law sectors, these accomplishments represent hard-fought progress, but it is also acknowledged that relatively little support has been extended to traditional forms of justice and rule of law. Traditional forms of conflict-resolution and justice represent legitimate mechanisms for a large proportion of the population, and as such, diverse models for justice and rule of law are reflective of Liberia's process of peacebuilding and statebuilding. It is critical for government and external partners to continue to reflect on the best balance of multiple forms of justice and conflict-resolution, especially since the establishment of the court system, public defenders and arbiters, though very impressive, is simply inadequate to address case loads and try cases fairly and professionally. In line with this, the Ministry of Justice along with the UNMIL and some other partners have embarked on organising a national conference on the customary and formal justice system slated for March 2010. This conference is intended to address the disparities and commonalities between the two justice systems in Liberia while looking for means to combine the two.

## **Infrastructure and basic services**

The GoL has launched various programmes to facilitate infrastructural rehabilitation and the delivery of basic services. These include the rehabilitation of several hundred kilometres of roads and the construction of bridges, rehabilitation of schools, clinics and community health facilities, financing community projects, rebuilding the electricity grid, revitalising the national strategy to fight HIV/AIDS and the fight against malaria and tuberculosis, rehabilitation of water pipelines in most parts of the capital city, initiating the process of school curriculum review, drafting a new national youth policy, launching a new girl's education policy and increasing budgetary allocation for health and education.

Over the short to medium term, the government will continue to focus strongly on electricity, water and sanitation, education, health and nutrition for all.

## **Social inclusion and targeting vulnerable groups**

Through the dedication of GoL and the support of partners, progress towards peacebuilding and statebuilding is underway. The PRS is the driving force behind this forward movement. The government recognises the importance of social inclusion of all groups in society if they want the country to move forward. Vulnerable groups such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, orphans children, and destitute families need support in the fight against poverty, hunger, malnutrition and unemployment; as well as the government recognizes the statebuilding comes with the promotion of their rights and freedoms.

## **Pooled funding mechanisms**

Operationalising the support for these development objectives across sectors can be greatly enhanced through the use of pooled funds mechanisms to underpin sector development strategies. This practice enables statebuilding advancements by helping to align donor resources behind development plans that have been articulated by government institutions and the utilisation of national frameworks to define future support. In the case of Liberia, a pooled fund for health was operationalised in support of the Health Sector Plan, and this working approach has allowed donors to support aspects of the strategy in line with the value that they can add and allows the government to broker collaborative relationships with other implanting partners, such as civil society and private sector players.

### **Establishment of the Liberia Peacebuilding Office (PBO)**

Supported by the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the PBO was established in 2008 to support the peacebuilding priorities outlined in the PRS, and to help ensure the delivery conflict sensitive policies and programmes. At the same time the PBO is intended to strengthen the coordination and coherence amongst the various peacebuilding actors and institutions in Liberia.

With an initial budget of \$15m for the first 18 months of implementation, the PBO supports peacebuilding projects covering a broad spectrum of activities, including: peace and human rights education in schools; civic education; youth empowerment; local and national reconciliation; reintegration of high risk youths, and enhancing police and civilian relations.

# 4 Conclusions and recommendations

## 4.1 Country specific recommendations

This section presents consolidated summaries of the outputs and recommendations of the Liberia National Dialogue Conference, relating directly to the bottlenecks, key issues and guiding questions described in section 3. Each of the thematic bottlenecks, issues and challenges was discussed by breakout groups, which presented the following recommendations.

### Policy development

#### *Post-PRS planning*

- *Enhance popular participation in formulation of National Development Plan:* The design of the next national development strategy should build-on the consultative process used during the design of the current PRS in order to ensure that the plan reflects the views and aspirations of all Liberian citizens. It is important that the document is popularly recognized as the overarching vision of the nation's development aspirations.
- *Disseminate the National Development Plan to enhance public support:* The group recommends that full and consolidated versions of the next national development strategy be translated into each of the primary dialects, and be made available through local government offices. The illiteracy rate of the population needs to be considered when disseminating information about the national development plan.
- *Pass legislation to protect continuity of National Development Strategy:* Consistency in the delivery of a national development strategy was highlighted as important, and the group recommends that the next national development plan be supported by legislation that protects it from fundamental change by newly elected political authorities.
- *Link the National Development Plan with National Visioning Process:* The nascent national visioning process should serve as the vehicle for developing and disseminating the next national development plan. The visioning process will entail the development of economic growth scenarios, from a technical perspective, and the promotion of dialogue around social cohesion, core cultural values, and national identity, from the social perspective. These are fundamental components of national development planning, and a strategic link between the processes must therefore be established.
- *Integrate peacebuilding as a specific pillar in National Development Plan:* Peacebuilding is identified as a cross-cutting theme in the current PRP, which leaves it as a rather nebulous concept, making targeted project design difficult. Given Liberia's recent past, peacebuilding should be represented as a distinct pillar of the next national development plan.
- *Increase social protection for vulnerable groups:* Social protection for highly vulnerable groups should be specified as a primary concern in the development of the next national development plan to prevent the generational transfer of poverty.

## **Complex aid conditionality**

- *Adapt aid conditionality to reflect local context:* Development partners should tailor conditionality to enhance, rather than hinder, international support to national peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities. For example, the government and its development partners are in the process of defining the parameters against which direct budget support could be extended to Liberia. These indicators will help to measure mutual confidence and accountability and illuminate where additional partner assistance can be targeted for greater impact.
- *Develop a national aid policy:* Government should design an aid policy that presents its perspectives on the receipt, coordination, application, monitoring and evaluation of development support. The development of the aid policy should be a collaborative effort between government and international partners to reduce aid overlap and to understand lessons learned.
- *Enhance national aid management capacities:* Conditionality will remain a feature of international development support, as will the question of the government's absorptive capacity to apply it effectively. Government and international partners must agree practicable conditionality, and develop a coherent strategy to establish effective aid management capacities within relevant government entities. This recommendation speaks to the requirements of both constituencies, and will enhance mutual accountability.

## **Implementation**

### **Addressing unpredictable levels of international support**

In the face of the global recession and the transition from relief to development, levels of international aid may decline. Liberia must prepare for this eventuality. Better alignment of international support with national priorities, per the Paris Declaration, will help mitigate the problem, but the longer term solution lies beyond aid support.

- *Develop a strategy for development and diversification of agricultural economy:* Working with the private sector to both stimulate economic growth and deliver increasing social services is critical for offsetting the reduction in foreign aid. Agro-industry is, potentially, a major driver of rural and national development. Liberia's agricultural sector must diversify beyond its traditional reliance on the rubber industry and, with its international partners, develop a policy framework for the development and diversification of the agriculture sector.
- *Encourage private sector support for national development objectives:* The private sector and financial institutions should be formally required (for example, through conditionality clauses in concession agreements) to deploy their considerable technical and financial acumen to broader (other than profit) developmental aims.
- *Develop a national policy to guide local economic development strategies:* Efforts to stimulate local economic development should be guided by the investments that the government is currently making in opening up economic growth corridors. These corridors should serve to stimulate secondary and tertiary uses of major infrastructure assets to promote growth and revenue collection leading to greater financial health for the entire country.

### **Constraints to effective monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes**

- *Develop more coherent monitoring and evaluation strategies:* Multiple monitoring and evaluation strategies undermine effective implementation of the PRS. Where national strategic planning frameworks and major sector initiatives are concerned, government and international partners should establish joint monitoring and evaluation criteria. The initial time and cost implications will be outweighed by greater delivery effectiveness.
- *Share responsibility for effective monitoring and evaluation strategies:* Government and international partners should assume joint responsibility for effective monitoring and evaluation strategies, but ultimately, responsibility must lie with government. The roles and responsibilities of the primary stakeholders should be defined in the national Aid Policy, but until such time as that is developed, the

LRDC Secretariat should facilitate government and partner dialogue on establishing more coherent monitoring and evaluation procedures.

- *Increase support for pooled funding mechanisms:* A model that enhances collaboration is the pooled funding mechanism. It requires collaborative budgeting, planning and performance review, and it implicitly supports the Paris Declaration Principles. Aid conditionalities that preclude international partners from contributing to pooled funding mechanisms should be revised.

## Capacity challenges

### *Insufficient mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity*

- *Establish a strategic connection between the Liberia PBO and the Liberia National Capacity Development Unit:* The former will provide technical inputs for the mainstreaming process, and the latter will provide guidance for strategic capacity development.
- *Establish a focal point between the PBO and public sector institutions to create a support network for peacebuilding practices and approaches.*
- *LRDC to promote compliance of all stakeholders:* To ensure effective mainstreaming of conflict sensitivities in policymaking and implementation (i.e. that the process requirements apply equally to government entities and international partners), government should assume a greater role in ensuring that relevant Ministries, international partners, and private sector entities comply, where practicable.

### *Institutional and human resource capacity development constraints*

- *International partners to align support behind National capacity Development Unit and National Capacity Development Strategy:* To ensure sustainable institutional and human capacity development, international partners should align with, and support, the government's long-term approach for capacity development across all sectors, public, private and civil society, as set forth in the National Capacity Development Strategy.
- *Support the multi-sector capacity development strategy:* The National Capacity Development Strategy provides a framework for investing in capacity development at all levels (human, institutional and the enabling environment) across all sectors and industries within a ten year planning horizon. Government and partners should work to systematically integrate capacity building into all sector development and reform strategies. This can be done through improved data and analytics on human capital, including baselines and targets, and the provision of technical support around key challenges in building sustainable capacity, such as the complex nature of technical assistance and project implementation units, more innovative skills / competency development approaches, change management and performance-based management practices, etc.
- *Strengthen knowledge management:* Given the multitude of capacity development projects, coordination and knowledge sharing across sectors must be strengthened. Investing in knowledge management and institutional support for the National Capacity Development Strategy is viewed as critical for effectively linking capacity development efforts across sectors and among a diverse range of players driving capacity development.

## Institutional framework challenges

Weak institutional arrangements between government agencies mean that they often fail to collaborate effectively, and fail to fulfil their respective and collective mandates. Contributory factors include overlapping mandates and functions and, conversely, tubular thinking within ministries leading to them working in isolation, rather than collaboration. International partners compound the problem by allocating and disbursing funds to one government institution for programme implementation, without involving all the other relevant stakeholders. This breeds competition, rather than collaboration, among government institutions. Recommendations in this area include the following:

- *Government to review of ministerial and departmental mandates:* To improve coordination between government agencies (thereby enhancing service delivery), government should review ministerial and

departmental mandates to redefine their respective roles and responsibilities. Government should also institute periodic reviews to ensure that the arrangements are being upheld.

- *Partners to engage more effectively with relevant government entities:* International partners must support this process by undertaking to engage all relevant government departments when planning the provision of development assistance.
- *Government to lead on information sharing:* With sufficient commitment from government and international partners, the government must then assume the responsibility to coordinate information sharing between all relevant departments, and that staff are adequately trained and equipped to fulfil their responsibilities.
- *National Capacity Development Unit, Civil Service Agency and international partners to devise an implementation plan:* None of the above will take effect without the requisite political will to define process and provide adequate human resources. Under the guidance of the National Capacity Development Unit, the government Civil Service Agency and international partners supporting civil service reform should develop an implementation plan to develop and deliver the recommendations. This process should begin with a review of current best practice, and design of a pilot process in a key peacebuilding and statebuilding priority area.

## **Corruption**

Mitigating corrupt political and business practices is a long-term process requiring focus on both the supply and demand sides of the equation. For every receiver of a bribe, there is a giver of a bribe.

- *Maintain an overarching commitment from government and partners to a joint anti-corruption strategy:* Government and international partners must address the issue by devising and applying requirements for greater accountability from, respectively, government entities at national and local levels, and private sector investors. These requirements should be buttressed by punitive measures for failure to comply.
- *Government and partners to commit to develop government internal auditing practices:* To ensure that corruption does not undermine economic growth and development, government and international partners must commit to developing the auditing practices within GoL, supporting the development and implementation of sound legislation and laws, and the strengthening the judicial system in order that punitive measures can be taken, where necessary.
- *Establish Office of Financial Management and Internal Audit Systems within all ministries:* In relation to audits, an Office of Financial Management, as well as an Internal Audit System, should be established within all ministries. The current external financial and performance auditing system, which is operated by the General Auditing Commission, should not only be used to unearth corruption, but its recommendations should be supported and implemented with support from the Ministry of Finance. As the General Auditing Commission reports to the legislature, it's important that the link between the legislative branch and executive branch be strengthened.
- *Institute supportive legislation to minimise corrupt practice in business:* Legislation is required to ensure that the legal mechanisms are developed and implemented to reduce corruption. This should include legislation that would penalise international companies or institutions that offer bribes in the form of cash or gifts. The Whistleblower Act and the Freedom of Information Bill are good examples of recently developed legislation that, if implemented properly, will reduce corruption.
- *Strengthen the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission:* The Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission should be strengthened, with consideration given to the functions of the Ministry of Justice.
- *Undertake a public awareness campaign on corrosive effects of corruption:* Corruption in Liberia is not restricted to government and commerce, it is a systemic, societal ill (deriving from the behaviour of social as well as political structures). Government and international partners should work to support public sensitisation programmes about the corrosive effects of corrupt behaviour at all levels of society.

- *GoL to ratify and apply international corruption conventions:* The development and implementation of these recommendations depends on the requisite political will and capacity to pursue them. Commitments must come from government and international partners. Government must take a proactive lead by ratifying and applying international corruption conventions (African Union, United Nations, ECOWAS), and implement African Peer Review Mechanisms.
- *Convene round table conference to create political and support for work of Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission:* International partners must align with government by collaborating to develop multi-donor mechanisms that specifically address the problem of corrupt practice. This will help drive the necessary political will within government. An example may be a multi-donor commitment to support capacity development within the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission. The first step in pursuing these recommendations should be a round-table conference, chaired by the Liberia Ant-Corruption Commission, between relevant government representatives and key international partners.

## 4.2 Recommendations and key questions for the International Dialogue

- International support to post-PRS planning is a major concern for peacebuilding and statebuilding in Liberia. Participants agreed that international support is critical but that the next development plan, national vision, needs to be a locally owned and driven plan. The Ministry of Planning and the Governance Commission have already developed a Concept Note to guide this process but need international support for its implementation. It was recognised by participants that the same broad-based consultative process used in developing the PRS ought to be used in the national visioning exercise.
- Participants suggested greater efforts be made on behalf of governments and international partners to strengthen local capacity. Enhancing local capacity can increase ownership and the undertaking of development plans by the local population. The support to capacity development should be long term and should focus on Liberian institutions and individuals rather than short term technical assistants that do not transfer knowledge or improve absorptive capacity. The use of local NGOs and the private sector could be additional means of improving local service delivery while building long term capacity.
- To enhance peacebuilding and statebuilding processes, financial support from international partners should align with the country's development plan. For international support to be effective, it must align with priorities identified by the Liberian people as articulated in their development plans. Conditionalities and rigidities that undermine alignment need to be critically examined and adjusted.
- When structuring aid conditionality, international partners should create country specific frameworks for better effectiveness. In an effort to strengthen peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, international partners should move towards greater use of country systems and institutions to enhance the state structure. International partners should increase attempts to align aid distribution with the priorities outlined by the government, representative of local development plans. Also, mutual accountability between government and all stakeholders remains critical to the peacebuilding and statebuilding processes.
- Aid portfolios need to be more long term and predictable. As Liberia moves toward a medium term expenditure framework (MTEF), the predictability of development aid will assist in planning.

# Annex A – Methodology

## Objectives of the country consultation

The objectives of the national consultations are to:

- Identify peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities at country level, as well as their inter-linkages, as a basis for preparing a framework for international objectives;
- Identify critical bottlenecks to effective international assistance at country level for consideration by the International Dialogue;
- Gather country-specific good practice and success stories to facilitate a sharing of country-level peacebuilding and statebuilding experiences; and
- Share knowledge, insights, and experience with different country-specific planning modalities and processes for identifying peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities.

## Approach and process

In Liberia the International Dialogue country level consultations began with a series of introductory meetings, individual and focus group, with representatives of government, civil society and international partners (including the United Nations, multi-lateral and bilateral donors, regional bodies and NGOs), during which the purpose and requirements of the dialogue were described and discussed.

Each stakeholder group developed a broad concept paper of the key issues (bottlenecks and best practices) and submitted for partner review. Once review was complete, consensus was reached on a set of key issues for discussion at the national dialogue meeting, and a set of questions to guide debate.

The National Dialogue Meeting was attended by approximately 60 representatives of key stakeholder groups, and was held over a working day on 12 March 2010. A mixture of plenary panels and breakout working groups discussed the key issues and formulated recommendations, providing the basis of the Country report, and the Workshop Report attached as annex C.

The visits of the international expert to Liberia, took place from January to March 2010. The list of respondents and participants is attached as annex B. The consultation meeting took place on 12 March 2010. It was attended by approximately 60 people.

## Acknowledgements

The report was prepared by Steve Archibald (consultant), assisted by James Kollie (Ministry of Planning and Economic Development), Lisa Reinartz (UNDP), Sam Quipoh (consultant), and the International Focal Point, Gillian Dare (UK Political Affairs Representative),

# Annex B – List of people consulted

## Interviews and focus groups

Name	Affiliation
Helge Flarga	UNDP
Fetseem G Abralia	UNDP
Cleophas Toron	UNDP
Maria Keating	UNDP
Ounzuba Kemeh-Gane	Governance Commission
Gilbert Ngesu	Governance Commission
Elizabeth Sele Mulbah	Governance Commission
Yarsua Weh- Dorliae	Governance Commission
Christiana Solomon	UNMIL
O Natty B Davis	Minister of State
Rev Christopher W Toe	Minister of Agriculture (former)
B Elias Shoniyyin	
Yancon-Dargbe Nimley	
Hon Jewel Howard-Taylor	Senator, Bong County
Hon Blamo Nelson	Senator
Hon Edward Mulbah	Peacebuilding Office
Hon Abraham A Fofana	Kofi Annan Centre
Hon Peter Z N Kamei	
Hon Yancon-Darargbe Nimley	
Hon Wilfred Gray-Johnson	Peacebuilding Office
Hon Ounzuba Kemeh-Gare	
Hon Dominic Sam	UNDP
Magdalene P Deshield	UNDP
Pamela White	USAID
C Bryant	USAID
Moustapha Soumare	UNDP
Baffour Agyeman-Duah	UNMIL
Ohene Owusu Onyanin	World Bank

Name	Affiliation
Gun Eriksson Skoog	SIDA
Fujimoto Makoto	JICA
Attilio Pacifici	EU
Anna Harvala	EU

### Consultation meeting

Name	Affiliation
Gillian Dare	United Kingdom (UK)
Moustapha Soumare	UNMIL
Serena Cavicchi	World Bank (WB)
Attilio Pacifici	European Union (EU)
Baffour Agyerman-Dnah	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
Stanley Kamara	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Christiana Solomon	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)/CA
Prosper Addo	African Union (AU)
Emmanuel Fiadzp	World Bank
Ambassador Asumana E Ceesay	Economic Community West African States (ECOWAS)
Herbert Standt	German Embassy
Fetsum G Abrala	UNDP
Lisa Reinarz	UNDP
Francis Kai-kai	UNMIL
Adriano Cassandra	UNMIL
Princitta Varmah	Ministry of Finance
Tianna Sherman	Ministry of State
James Dorbor Jallah	Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs
Gmasonah T Aboah	Ministry of Internal Affairs
O. Natty B Davis	Ministry of State
Pariau Seodius	Ministry of State
Wilfred Gray-Johnson	Peacebuilding Organization/Ministry of Internal Affairs
James Logan	Ministry of Agriculture
Coustone Morris Hope	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Augustine Konneh	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
George W J Folegio	Ministry of Internal Affairs
John K Langlely	National Elections Commission
Edwin W Harris	General Auditing Commission
Peggy V Meres	Public Procurement and Concession Commission
Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae	Governance Commission

Name	Affiliation
Dominic Tarpeh	Governance Commission
Dr Jabaru S Carlon	Governance Commission
Dr David Kialain	Governance Commission
Abraham Mitchell	Governance Commission
Flamah Howard	Federation of Liberian Youth (FLY)
Edward R A Smith	Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI)
Thomas Doe Nah	CENTRAL
Vasco M Brown	Foundation for Human Rights and Development (FORHD)
Charles E Nyontee	Federation of Liberian Youth
Eddie Jarwolo	NAYMOTE
Isaac J Weah	LAHRK
Daniel H Allison	LIRDA
Comince Ninleln	
Rev Augustine S Arkoi	Montserrado County Peace Committee
Edward Quiqui	Montserrado County Peace Committee
J Emmanuel Z Bowier	Christ Towel Bowin Ministries
Langley Aya Kialain	Liberia Chamber of Commerce
Theresa S Jordan	Civil Service Agency
Samukai V Dukuly	Power TV
Isaac Freeman	Power TV
Joseph Smart	ELWA
Augustine Octavius	King-FM
Jackson Worlobah	Central Bank of Liberia
D Nyandeh Siah Sr	National Democratic Party of Liberia
Jay E Flanjay	
Keke Nah	

# Annex C – Workshop report